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teaching network security.  For educators to fully realize the benefit of such a facility, 
proto-type exercise scenarios are also needed.  The paper is based on a model laboratory 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE OF STUDY 
The intent of this thesis is twofold; first, to demonstrate how a Reconfigurable 
Cyber Exercise Laboratory (RCEL) can be designed and used in support of an 
information assurance education program.  Second, to design six cyber exercise scenarios 
that can be used as models for other information assurance programs. 
Within this thesis, the author will describe the RCEL implemented at NPS, the 
stations and the services implemented in that facility.  Next, the paper will develop 
learning objectives achieved through activities in the RCEL.  The learning objectives will 
then be related to courses in an information assurance program.  The information 
assurance curriculum of the Naval Postgraduate School will be used as a foundation for 
this analysis.   
With the educational foundation in place, six practical cyber exercise scenarios 
will be described.  Each exercise scenario presents a different use for the RCEL and 
associates the exercise with learning objectives, classes and supporting documents 
referenced in this work.  
B.  SCOPE OF THIS WORK 
1. Research Questions 
The research questions to be addressed by this thesis will focus on solving the 
complex issues related to establishing a supportive, realistic laboratory environment in 
which information assurance topics can be safely explored.  When building a RCEL to 
provide enhanced teaching and learning opportunities within an information assurance 
curriculum, the following questions must be addressed: 
1. What interaction opportunities exist between a RCEL and concurrently 
presented information assurance courses? 
2. What equipment is needed (minimum and optimal) in this facility? 
3. What services or stations should be available in the RCEL? 
  2
4. What are the optimal security procedures and policies for each service, 
OS, and device in the RCEL? 
5. How can a RCEL organization achieve safe interaction with external 
RCELs in both attack and defense postures? 
6. What security concepts and practices can be effectively presented in the 
RCEL? 
7. What exercise scenarios demonstrate effective use of the RCEL? 
2. Research Objectives 
This thesis will present the following:  
1. To identify existing academic standards, (if any), directly related to 
computer security education.  
2. To propose a flexible topology that models a general-purpose network 
that is rapidly reconfigurable and supports the study of IA topics.  
3. The thesis will develop a list of learning objectives and their mapping to 
the prototype exercise scenarios.  
4. To define six proto-type cyber-exercise scenarios that provide effective  
models for security exercises.  
5. The thesis will present relevant information needed to conduct post-
exercise analysis of the exercise data.  
  3
II. THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL 
RECONFIGURABLE CYBER-EXERCISE LABORATORY 
A.  JUSTIFICATION FOR THE CREATION OF A RECONFIGURABLE 
CYBER-EXERCISE LABORATORY TO SUPPLEMENT TRADITIONAL 
INSTRUCTION  
Tables 1 and 2 are from the SANS (SysAdmin, Audit, Network, Security) 
Institute web site (http://www.sans.org/resources/errors.php#top).  Table 1 emphasizes 
the need for good information assurance (IA) and cyber-security education.  Note, that of 
the seven management errors listed, all can be mitigated through information assurance 
education. 
Table 1. The 7 Top Management Errors that Lead to Computer Security 
Vulnerabilities (As determined by the 1,850 computer security experts and 
managers meeting at the SANS99 and Federal Computer Security Conferences held 
in Baltimore May 7-14, 1999) 
Number Seven:  Pretend the problem will go away if they ignore it.  
Number Six:  Authorize reactive, short-term fixes so problems re-emerge rapidly  
Number Five: Fail to realize how much money their information and organizational reputations are worth.  
Number Four:  Rely primarily on a firewall.  
Number Three:  
Fail to deal with the operational aspects of security: make a few fixes and 
then not allow the follow through necessary to ensure the problems stay 
fixed  
Number Two:  
Fail to understand the relationship of information security to the business 
problem -- they understand physical security but do not see the 
consequences of poor information security.  
Number One:  Assign untrained people to maintain security and provide neither the training nor the time to make it possible to do the job.   
Before expounding on the specific learning objectives addressable in the 
reconfigurable cyber-exercise laboratory (RCEL), it is essential to understand what kind 
of issues IA practitioners should be aware of.  Again, referring to research conducted at 
the SANS Institute, we see in Table 2 that the most egregious security problems are 
spawned by the IT staff. 
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Table 2. Top 10 Mistakes IT Professionals Make Regarding Security 
Number 1 Connecting systems to the Internet before hardening them. 
Number 2 Connecting test systems to the Internet with default accounts/passwords  
Number 3 Failing to update systems when security holes are found.  
Number 4 Using telnet and other unencrypted protocols for managing systems, 
routers, firewalls, and PKI. 
Number 5 Giving users passwords over the phone or changing user passwords in 
response to telephone or personal requests when the requester is not 
authenticated.  
Number 6 Failing to maintain and test backups. 
Number 7 Running unnecessary services, especially ftpd, telnetd, finger, rpc, mail, 
rservices 
Number 8 Implementing firewalls with rules that don't stop malicious or dangerous 
traffic-incoming or outgoing. 
Number 9 Failing to implement or update virus detection software 
Number 10 Failing to educate users on what to look for and what to do when they 
see a potential security problem. 
Number 11 
(Bonus cause) 
Allowing untrained, uncertified people to take responsibility for 
securing important systems. 
  
The reconfigurable cyber-exercise laboratory(RCEL) used in an academic 
program addresses the issues raised by the SANS Institute and provides an opportunity 
for students to learn effective IA practices in a safe environment.  The RCEL, however, 
goes far beyond just hands-on training.  It empowers the instructor or professor to follow 
the three critical steps of learning: show, demonstrate, and do [ELE01].  
In an ERIC Digest (Educational Resource Information Clearinghouse, now 
defunct) published in 1997, Travis, stated regarding models for improving college 
teaching:  
As learning becomes more complex, students frequently depend 
upon faculty to assist them with a multitude of obstacles. Yet, given the 
typical preparation college faculty receive for teaching (ed. little or none), 
the tendency to concentrate on presentational methods, like the lecture, 
can aggravate students' difficulties with learning. Consequently, 
instructors are encouraged to stop viewing teaching as “covering the 
content” and to start viewing it as "helping the students learn" [WEI01] 
Teaching and learning information assurance is challenging.  Often traditional 
teaching methods are not adequate or comprehensive.  For some students, gaining a 
 through understanding of IA is not fully achievable in a classroom.  A student’s learning 
experience is enhanced when they have configured a router, perpetrated or been the 
victim of an attack and “experienced” security.  The RCEL provides that hands-on 
experience to supplement traditional presentation.  In Figure 1, learners who supplement 
traditional educational with hands-on activities remember 90% of the lesson compared to 
only 20% from a traditional lecture [DAL01].     
 
Figure 1. Edgar Dale's Cone of learning [DAL01] 
 
B. NPS RCEL OVERVIEW  
A RCEL is a computer laboratory facility which can be rapidly changed to 
accommodate various activities.  Traditional computer laboratories tend to be static in 
configuration and difficult to change.  The RCEL is a flexible collection of equipment 
that can be quickly interconnected and configured.  Organizations can develop 
configurations for each piece of equipment or functionality.  These configurations can be 
stored and when needed deployed quickly using like Symantec Ghost.   
Unlike a traditional computer lab that must support many students performing a 
wide variety of activities, the RCEL need not have any specific configuration.  The type 
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 and scope of activities to be conducted determines the design, layout, and interconnection 
requirements.  The RCEL need only have sufficient equipment to provide a meaningful 
network environment.   
Figure 2 shows a minimal RCEL exercise configuration.  Each LAN (Local Area 
Network) is achievable with as little as a router and a computer.  In Figure 2, the VPN 
(Virtual Private Network) gateway is any VPNcapable device i.e., a router, computer, or 
dedicated appliance.   The LAN on either side can be any combination of network-
attachable devices.   The size and complexity of the LAN is based on the needs and 
resources of the organization.  The attacker and defender LANs need not have matching 
configurations.   
 
Figure 2. RCEL Concept Diagram 
 
 
1.  Requirement for VPN 
A critical design requirement is the isolation of exercise traffic from any public 
networks.  Figure 2 shows the fundamental structure of an attack/defend exercise.  VPN 
Gateways isolate each LAN from the public Internet.  Note, the “Internet” cloud is any 
ISO layer 1 and 2 configuration for passing IP traffic.  The only functional requirement 
on this “internet” is that it must provide functional connectivity between the VPN 
gateways.  The secure configuration of the VPN Gateways is critical when the RCEL is 
connected to another organization via the real Internet.  The VPN is discussed in detail in 
Chapter VI.   
 6
 If the attacker and defender are within the same organization and their respective 
networks are air-gapped from any other network, the VPN is unnecessary.  However, the 
RCEL described in this work assumes the attacker and defender are sufficiently remote to 
necessitate internetworking across some portions of the public infrastructure.  
 
Figure 3. Example Security Training Exercise 
Figure 3, shows how four organizations might interact and interconnect for a 
cyber exercise.  When the VPNs are in place and working correctly, there is no danger of 
spillover onto networks or devices traversed between locations. 
The Attacker LAN may use any means (agreed upon by the interacting 
organizations) to breach the systems of the Defender LAN.  This includes any form of 
malware as well as more interactive exploits.  The activity of the Attacker is 
cryptographically constrained within the VPN tunnel and therefore is allowed to pass 
across public networks to reach the Defender.   
The Defender/Attacker LAN consists of various interconnected computers.  The 
RCEL configured at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) was interconnected via Cat-5 
[NAT17] cabling in a 10/100 Base-T Ethernet configuration.   
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 An air-gapped lab was chosen for the RCEL, but one in which access to the 
campus LAN was possible (though carefully controlled).  The NPS RCEL maintains at 
least one computer that is not part of the scenario lab, but is connected to the campus 
LAN, that is made available for research and communication, mostly e-mail.  This 
dedicated machine has proven very useful in downloading patches and software tools to 
strengthen the network, as well as documents for help and guidance.  (For a more detailed 
description of this access station, see Station Description 23 below.) 
 
Figure 4. NPS RCEL Stations 
Figure 4 shows the physical layout for the Naval Postgraduate School‘s RCEL.  
The Naval Postgraduate School has set up the RCEL with as few as three people, each 
assigned to several stations.  The design allows 18-24 students to participate comfortably.  
Each seat represents a specific network function such as IDS or Firewall, which can be 
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assigned to an individual or team.  Each location has a monitor which may be connected 
to any of several computers or a laptop.  Multiplexing of each seat is accomplished using 
KVM (Keyboard, Video, Mouse) switches which allow a single station to connect with 
up to four computers. 
C. NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL RECONFIGURABLE CYBER-
EXERCISE LABORATORY NETWORK DESIGN 
The NPS RCEL utilized existing equipment, which was in place as a result of 
previous acquisitions and funded exercises.  The equipment currently includes: 16 Dell 
Servers, 1 Apple G4, Cisco 4224 Layer 3 switch, Cisco Routers (numerous), Cisco PIX 
506 Firewall, 2 Dell Laptops, 2 Sun Netra X1 servers, numerous small hubs and switches.  
The RCEL also benefits from relationships with local corporations For example, Cisco 
Systems recently donated several routers, switches, and a Pix 506 firewall.  
Figure 51 presents the general topology of the NPS RCEL network.  The topology 
is based on the concept that the NPS RCEL is the Top Level DNS Domain for this and 
any attached networks.   
In the topology, hubs 1,2 & 3 are treated as non-existent: they have no impact on 
security.  These “non-existent” hubs are part of the data collection package that provides 
a means for assessment and monitoring.  Connections shown with dotted lines are 








Figure 5. NPS RCEL Topology 
 
To give the student a realistic experience managing complex networks the NPS 
RCEL uses subnets and makes extensive use of VLANs.  In the topology in Figure 5, 
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server IP addresses are fixed and correspond to the VLAN (Virtual Local Area Network) 
to which the server is associated.  Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
(DHCP)[DRO01] addresses are provided for individual non-server workstations.  
Employing VLANs provides the opportunity for the students to create ACLs (Access 
Control Lists) for the Cisco switch and perform specific filtering for each network 
segment based on that segment’s functions and applications. 
Designing a RCEL can be taken to extremes.  For example, networks can be 
constructed with VPN ( Virtual Private Network) encrypted tunnels between every major 
device (refer to RFCs 2401, 2406, 2407, 2408 and 2409), complex naming schemes, 
exhaustively long and complex passwords, encryption on all data moving between 
devices and so on.  Such complexity, while apparently increasing security, is very hard to 
maintain.   In the book Security in Computing, Pfleeger [PFL01] argues complexity 
actually decreases the overall security due to increased likelihood of configuration 
mistakes, and the added complexity of managing and verifying correct security 
implementation.  An effective RCEL then is a balance of functionality, security and 
student usability.  
The RCEL is designed to incorporate as much functionality of a real network 
environment as possible.  The  network operating system (NOS) of the network shown in 
Figure 5 resides on the PDC and BDC servers. The NOS provides the applications that 
deliver network services such as authentication and domain control.  The NOS for the 
RCEL at NPS is Microsoft Windows 2000 Server. 
D. STATIONS WITHIN THE RECONFIGURABLE CYBER-EXERCISE 
LABORATORY 
For educational purposes, the RCEL is organized into a number of “stations.”  
Each station is defined as an area of responsibility which can be assigned to a student or 
group.  In keeping with Saltzer and Schroeder’s design principles of economy of 
mechanism and separation of privilege [SAL01], each station has a singular purpose , 
e.g., to provide network authentication or provide network switching.  Students assigned 
to a particular station are expected to “get to know” that station thoroughly and how that 
station integrates into the larger RCEL network. 
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The station concept provides  flexibility while providing a measure of control and 
accountability over students.  Stations can be assigned by student interest, skill, 
availability or any scheme suitable to the circumstances of the exercise. 
Within the NPS RCEL, 23 stations have been identified and are described below.  
A * indicates stations that are planned but not implemented and ** indicates a station that 
is not connected to any of the others as of the completion of this document (March 26, 
2004).   
1. Authentication – This station establishes and manages the network 
authentication service. Users are required to authenticate to some network 
service such as X-500 (An OSI protocol for managing online directories of 
users and resources.), Active Directory, or Novell.  The station manager 
installs and configures the authentication technique and associated 
software and hardware to be used. 
2. PDC (Primary Domain Controller) - The PDC holds the SAM (System 
Account Manager) Sam is a password database stored as a registry file in 
Windows based networks and authenticates access requests from 
workstations and servers in the domain.  The Authentication service may 
be combined with this station.  The person(s) assigned to this station 
would implement and manage this functionality in accordance with the 
network architecture plan. 
3. BDC (Backup Domain Controller) – As the name implies, this server 
backs up the PDC in case of failure (or attack).  The most important role 
here is managing how the network switches to the BDC in the event on an 
interruption of the PDC. 
4. Vulnerability Assessment – This station is used to port scan, enumerate 
and probe the associated network to assess the effectiveness of the 
implemented security plan. This station is a laptop (in the NPS RCEL) 
connected only for testing and monitoring purposes.  It is not considered 
part of the active network and is connected to the network at any point to 
provide active testing or data collection via a dumb hub.  The manager of 
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this station is responsible for acquiring the vulnerability assessment tools, 
knowing their proper use, performing active probing and vulnerability 
assessments and reporting results to those responsible for configuring the 
servers or services. 
5. DNS (Domain Name System) – The DNS server provides a query service 
used for translating hostnames into IP addresses.  The functionality of the 
DNS server is specified by IETF (Internet Engineering Task Force) STD 
13 [MOC01]. STD 13 is published by the Internet Engineering Task Force 
specifies standards and implementation characteristics of DNS. There are 
numerous publicly available DNS implementations.  The Naval 
Postgraduate School chose DJBDNS (available from  
http://ww.djbdns.org) for the RCEL[DJB01].   
6. FTP (File Transfer Protocol) – This station provides a server running the 
FTP server daemon.  This service allows users to move data into (FTP put) 
and out (FTP get and mget) of the server.  The file transfer protocol is 
specified in RFC-959 [POS01].  There are many FTP vulnerabilities and 
exploits.  A recent (January 2004) search of the CERT database found 282 
(http://www.cert.org) exploits and vulnerabilities related to FTP services.    
7. *PKI CA/RA(Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Registration 
Authority) [NAT02]– This station will include a local certificate authority 
which will be able to issue, revoke and validate PKI certificates to users.  
These certificates are only valid on the RCEL network or other exercise-
participant networks attached via the VPN. 
8. Email – This station implements an email server such as MS Exchange, 
Eudora, Linux email server, etc.  The choice of software is decided in the 
analysis and design of the network.  Each organization may have a 
preference or constraint that determines the choice of email service.  The 
NPS RCEL implements Linux mail (because it is free).  Email distribution 
and security rules are in accordance with the particular exercise security 
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plan.  Like FTP, E-mail is another primary source of intrusion by 
outsiders.  The proper security configuration of this service is crucial.  
9. Web –  This station provides Web services in as specified in RFC-1945 
[BER02]. It is one of the most vulnerable parts of the network as the web 
server must allow access to fulfill its primary function of delivering 
content.  The manager of this station implements web pages that provide 
the necessary functionality to access databases, run CGI (Common 
Gateway Interface) scripts and Java scripts.  This station is a primary 
target for attack. 
10. *Wireless – Wireless access points allow authorized users with wireless 
devices to access the RCEL network.  The manager of this station must 
carefully guard against access by non-RCEL users.  The manager must 
also be knowledgeable, or willing to learn, about wireless technology and 
the implications of implementing wireless solutions.  To prevent the 
“parking lot” attack described by Arbaugh[ARB01]  strong authentication 
is required.  Implementing this station involves not only the primary 
RCEL instructor, but the local network administrator as well. 
11. *HoneyNet – The manager of this station will be responsible for 
implementing the selected HoneyNet product and writing the proper router 
scripts to direct selected traffic into the trap.  Although a lot of legal 
wrangling is currently making the news regarding HoneyNet [PFL01, 
MCC01] implementations, this station provides a useful learning tool in 
the RCEL.  In addition to traditional HoneyNet products, unique 
technologies such “La Brea Tar Pits” software or other “sticky” solutions 
can be implemented and tested.   
12. *SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) –  The CISR, 
Center for Information Systems Security Studies and Research, has 
acquired the equipment for, and is active in, SCADA research.  As that 
effort matures, SCADA might become another dimension of the RCEL in 
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the future. Not all schools/agencies that implement a RCEL will 
necessarily be interested in SCADA network security  
13. MySQL (Database server) – This station represents a typical data server 
for a web page.  MySQL was chosen as the database simply because it is 
free and widely supported on the Internet.  The database server in the NPS 
RCEL is configured with MySQL.  This choice was made because 
MySQL is open source.  Any significant database engine such as Oracle or 
MS-SQL or even MS Access can be used for this purpose.  The station 
manager must know SQL and database design.  The database typically 
provides or accepts data from the Web application but may be directly 
accessed as well.  Most modern networks have some data retrieval or 
search capability, so this station is significant in providing a “real world” 
aspect to the RCEL. 
14. Routers – The RCEL has several routers which can be connected 
separately or in an HSRP (Hot Standby Routing Protocol) [LAR01] 
failover configuration.  The routers are a key element of the network’s 
perimeter security.  The manager of this station(s) will configure the 
software (i.e., IOS running-configuration file) and write and verify 
filtering access control lists (ACLs).  Most students have not had IOS 
(Internetwork Operating System, ®Cisco Systems) experience, so it is 
essential for the instructor to provide assistance.  A vast amount of helpful 
documentation is available on the Internet and from official government 
sources like the NSA (National Security Agency) and NIST (National 
Institute of Standards and Technology).   
15. Firewall – Like the routers, the firewall is programmed to implement a 
major portion of the security plan.  The RCEL uses a Cisco Pix® 506 
firewall which is programmed in IOS like the router.  The station manager 
must program the Firewall to allow or block traffic as appropriate to the 
exercise.  For organizations building an RCEL, other firewall products are 
available.  Each firewall product will have a different configuration 
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interface and different strengths and weaknesses.  Restrictions on which 
products can be used may apply for organizations within the DoD as not 
all such products are manufactured in the US. 
16. IDS (Intrusion Detection System) – The NPS RCEL IDS station is 
connected to the border router via a hub. Tapping the network before 
filtering allows the IDS to collect more traffic to get a better baseline of 
traffic patterns and to gather the largest amount of data for analysis.  
Tapping after the firewall would reduce traffic as the easily filtered or 
nuisance traffic would have been eliminated.  As a scholastic environment,    
NPS chose to gather the maximum amount of traffic to facilitate analysis.  
NPS uses Snort™ from Snort.org.  Snort™ is popular and widely 
supported by resources on the Internet.  The station manager will be 
required to install and set up Snort™ to comply with the security and 
analytical requirements developed for the exercise.  
17. DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) – This function can be part 
of the Primary Domain Controller or may exist separately.  The manager 
of this station configures the DHCP service in accordance with the RCEL 
exercise topology. The purpose of DHCP is to provide IP addresses to 
stations which do not have IP addresses already assigned to them.   
18. Disk Imaging - This station provides backups of setups or configurations 
in the event a disk is corrupted.  The ghost images are captured from a 
well defined configuration prior to an exercise.  The Naval Postgraduate 
School uses Symantec’s Norton Ghost product which is ideal for this task.  
There are other products for this purpose such as ImagIt 1.0 which can be 
downloaded as a trial version but is costly to purchase. The station may 
also use an existing utility like dd(© 1989-2000 AT&T Corp.).  The 
advantage of dd is that forensic duplicates can be made and data extracted 
when the exercises are over.   
19. VPN (Virtual Private Network)  NAT15, NAT10, RUS01, MCC01, 
KEN01, LAR01, FRA01, NAT17]- This station is the most critical station 
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in assuring RCEL success and security.  Since the VPN  isolates the RCEL 
from the Internet, it must be configured carefully and checked thoroughly.  
The VPN manager will also interact with any other organizations engaged 
in an exercise, providing critical IP address information and VPN 
configuration data to allow for successful interconnection between 
exercise participants. 
20. Syslog (Auditing) – [ROS01, DAY01, KEL01, GER01] This station 
collects error messages and event log information for later analysis.  The 
manager of this station configures not only the syslog server but all 
reporting servers.  The reporting servers are configured to provide specific 
information in the syslog format [ROS01, DAY01].  Auditing is reviewing 
and analyzing in some way, electronic or manual, the information captured 
and stored. [KEL01].  Gerhards [GER01] provides a specific format for 
arriving syslog information and it is suggested in this work that managers 
of the syslog station adopt Gerhards’ proposed standard. 
21. Switches – The switch acts upon the content of the Ethernet frame it 
receives and forwards the frame to the appropriate outbound Ethernet port.  
The switch provides isolation between ports and VLANs to allow for 
traffic segregation and management.  The NPS RCEL currently uses a 
Cisco 4224 Catalyst switch programmed in Cisco IOS v12.0.  This switch 
provides for VLANs with separate ACLs.  The exercise activities for any 
given configuration will be the guide for setting up the switch.  NSA and 
NIST provide some excellent guides [NAT16, NAT17], and suggested 
configurations for network switches that serve well as a starting point for 
switch configuration.  Cisco also provides excellent documentation. 
22. Printer –  Typical configuration of a printer takes only a few minutes.  The 
importance of the printer; however, is not so much in its explicit 
functionality as in its proper (secure) configuration to prevent hackers 
from accessing the printer and possibly gaining access to other systems on 
the RCEL network.  Many modern network printers run small web servlets 
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which are exploitable if visible to the network.  These printers also often 
have open telnet and FTP ports and services.  Printers also have a 
language of their own which can be exploited.  For example, Hewlett 
Packard printers use PCL (Printer Control Language) and PJL (Printer Job 
Language) to manage and control printing tasks.  The PJL code below 
written and published by a hacker known as LittleW01f [LIT01] will 





 while ($TRUE); do 
 $NC $1 9100X@PJL OPMSG DISPLAY=\"Printer Fault \" 
 sleep 2 
 done 
The manager of the printer station, therefore, has a challenging assignment 
because few people have experience with printer interfaces and 
technologies.  The learning curve on this station is especially steep.  
23. **DIA (Dedicated Internet Access) – This station is added as a 
convenience to facilitate communication and research on the Internet 
while the RCEL remains isolated.  It is not assigned to a specific student 
manager, rather the instructor or area manager must ensure this station 
remains isolated from the RCEL LAN.  The DIA station is wired 
separately and has only one NIC (Network Interface Card) so it cannot be 
on both networks simultaneously. 
Each station also represents some hardware and interconnection into the network 
(except the dedicated internet access station).  When fully implemented, the RCEL will 
require a lot of time to configure correctly.  If only the assigned lab hours of a typical 
course (usually 2) are used, it will take most of the semester/quarter to achieve optimal 
full implementation and testing.  . 
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III. SURVEY OF INFORMATION ASSURANCE TOPICS IN 
THE NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL IA 
CURRICULUM 
NPS is one of few schools in the country to have an information assurance track 
at the Master’s level.  CISR (The Center for Information Systems Security Studies and 
Research) oversees the IA track.  The curriculum matrix below shows the courses 
required in the CISR IA track at the Naval Postgraduate School, and is specific to the 
Scholarship For Service program[SFS01].  The courses in grey are those that specifically 
address information security topics. 
Table 3. Naval Postgraduate School Information Security Course   
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In the above matrix, the shaded courses might benefit from practical exercises 
within the RCEL.  The intention of this work is to show representative applications of the 
RCEL in the context of these and other courses selected from the IA track.   
In this chapter, a list of IA topics is presented.  There are other possible IA topics 
covered at other teaching organizations, but this list is reasonably comprehensive, and  
provides a grounding for any IA program. 
Four major concerns of IA are [IRV04]; confidentiality, integrity, availability, and 
authenticity.  Non-repudiation is sometimes included as a fifth major attribute of IA;  
however, here non-repudiation is considered to be derived from a combination of 
mechanisms used to achieve integrity and authenticity, and is therefore not treated as a 
unique attribute.  The following definitions are from the NSTISSI No. 4009 National 
Information Assurance Glossary created by the NSA [CNS01]. 
Confidentiality:  Assurance that information is not disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, processes, or devices. The process of teaching 
how to enforce confidentiality, therefore, must include an emphasis on 
cryptography as well as mechanisms for protected communication, access 
control mechanisms and privacy controls. 
 
Integrity:  Quality of an IS [information system] reflecting the logical 
correctness and reliability of the operating system; the logical 
completeness of the hardware and software implementing the protection 
mechanisms; and the consistency of the data structures and occurrence of 
the stored data. Note that, in a formal security context, integrity is 
interpreted more narrowly to mean assured detection of accidental or 
intentional modification of information.   
 
Integrity can only be assured if there is a certainty that data (the resource) was not 
inappropriately altered.  To teach integrity, topics relating to interception, replay, data 
insertion, data modification, message authentication, hashing, change detection, digital 
signatures and key management must be included.  The following definitions are also 
from the NSTISSI No. 4009. 
Availability:  Timely, reliable access to data and information services for 
authorized users. Topics related to availability that must be taught in an 
effective security program include backup strategies, data and system 
redundancy, interception, blocking, denial of service issues and physical 
protection. 
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Authentication:  Security measure designed to establish the validity of a 
transmission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying an 
individual's authorization to receive specific categories of information. 
Topics related to authenticity that must be taught separately include the 
threat related to spoofing data or users, user authentication, shared secrets, 
digital certificates and digital signatures.  There will be overlap with topics 
relating to the achievement of integrity; however, especially in the area of 
hashing and digital signatures. 
These four critical concerns form the foundation of IA and surface frequently in 
the NPS IA curriculum. Here they will be used to form the starting point of our 
identification of topics that can be taught, demonstrated, or discovered in the RCEL.  Not 
all IA topics lend themselves well to RCEL lab exercises.  Our focus in this work is on 
those topics supported by RCEL activities.   
A. MODEL IA COURSES AND POSSIBLE RCEL APPLICATION 
The Naval Postgraduate School’s Computer Science Department’s security 
curriculum (at the time of this writing) contains the courses that will be discussed here.  
This list is not exhaustive, but rather representative.  The list presented gives a broad 
perspective of the possible uses of the RCEL.   
Please note, the following course descriptions are taken from the NPS online 
catalog (http://cisr.nps.navy.mil/academics.html) and are italicized to distinguish them 
from the remainder of this work.  
1. CS-3600 (4, 2) Information Assurance: Introduction to Computer 
Security 
Provides a comprehensive overview of the terminology, concepts, issues, policies, 
and technologies associated with the field of Information Assurance. It covers the notions 
of threats, vulnerabilities, risks and safeguards as they pertain to the desired information 
security properties of confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and availability for all 
information that is processed, stored, or transmitted in information systems. 
RCEL activities available for the lab section of this class include: examining the 
exercise network configuration, demonstrating possible vulnerabilities through scanning 
or probing the network, demonstrating trusted paths by showing login procedures and 
how the trusted path is called, firewall and router setup can be shown by the attempting to 
transmit an improper or filtered packet into the network, etc. 
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There are also many potential applications of cryptography in the RCEL.  When 
the PKI station is activated, it will become even more so (e.g., dynamically issuing server 
certificates, validating certificates for relying parties, etc.).  Existing cryptographic 
applications include most authentication schemes, the construction and operation of 
VPN’s, and multiple file encryption schemes available on the various operating systems.   
2. CS-3670 (3, 2) Information Assurance: Secure Management of Systems 
Provides students with a security manager’s view of the diverse management 
concerns associated with administering and operating an automated information system 
facility with minimized risk. Students will examine both the technical and non-technical 
security issues associated with managing a computer facility, with emphasis on DoD 
systems and policies. Students will earn CNSS (formerly NSTISSI) certification for: 
INFOSEC professional, Systems Administrator, and ISSO. 
The point of this class is to teach how to securely manage computer systems.  The 
RCEL provides an excellent example system as opportunities for demonstrating best 
practices in secure management abound.  The great advantage of the RCEL is that a 
failure of a security practice here is not catastrophic: students can make mistakes in a safe 
environment.   
Activities in the RCEL for this class might include security surveys and 
checklists, management policy development, implementation and compliance, security 
properties of the network and how they are implemented, and hands-on writing of ACLs 
for routers and firewalls.  Other activities are limited only by time and the imagination of 
the instructor. 
3. CS-3675 (3, 2) Network Vulnerability Assessment 
This course is designed to give the student exposure to Internet security threats in 
a lab environment. Lectures and labs provide the student with a "hands on" experience 
with current network attacks and vulnerabilities. Foot-printing, scanning, enumeration 
and escalation are addressed from an attack prospective. Emphasis on detection and 
protection of critical data and nodes is addressed. A final project that demonstrates skills 
and knowledge is required. 
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During this course, the students are taught how a variety of exploits work and are 
introduced to tools for scanning, enumerating, and penetrating systems.  Use of the RCEL 
allows students to safely use these tools against a “real” system. In addition, assessing the 
vulnerability of the RCEL during a student attack exercise and adjusting security in an 
effort to thwart such activity gives students within the RCEL practical, real experience. 
4. CS-3690 (4, 2) Network Security   
Addresses the concepts and technologies used to achieve confidentiality, integrity, 
authenticity and availability in a networked/internetworked environment.  Topics include: 
fundamentals of TCP/IP, switching and routing, core network security principles, 
firewall types and methodology, packet-level traffic analysis, cryptographic protocols, 
virtual private networks, and public key infrastructures. 
This class starts by strengthening the student’s understanding of networking.  The 
RCEL will be a major part of that by allowing the students to actually see and test various 
aspects of a functioning network.   
5. CS-4600 (3, 2) Secure Computer Systems   
This course covers implementation of protection for monolithic and distributed 
secure computer systems. The problems of subversion and confinement are addressed 
through lifecycle assurance methodologies for highly secure components. Topics include: 
protection hardware, implementing virtual machines through effective memory 
management techniques, synchronization mechanisms, critical sections, SWE 
methodologies, and configuration mgt techniques. 
The RCEL can provide a test bed for the Flaw Hypothesis Methodology (FHM) 
used in this class.  For example, red team (attack activities) used in the RCEL during an 
exercise may serve as empirical proof of the existence of a flaw. 
6. CS-4603 (3, 1) Database Security 
Course topics include: policies for information integrity and confidentiality of 
database (DB) systems, modeling of secure DB systems, implementation issues (e.g., 
atomicity, serialization, and view-based control), security in statistical DBs, security 
approaches for object-oriented DBs, multi-tier architecture security issues, privacy, 
aggregation and inference, and military applications of secure DBs. 
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The RCEL provides for a database station.  This station serves as a demonstration 
platform for database-dependent applications.  Many applications, rely on databases to 
collect, organize and provide data on demand.    The students assigned to this station will 
benefit from the interaction of the database with other stations of the RCEL. 
7. CS-4614 (3, 1) Advanced Topics in Computer Security  
This course covers advanced topics in software, communications, and data 
security. Military and commercial INFOSEC policies are studied, including: software 
and hardware subversions; advances in operating systems, databases and network 
security; evaluation criteria for secure systems; logics; cryptographic protocols; 
techniques for implementing supporting policies; and emerging issues. 
The RCEL could serve as a demonstration platform for many of the topics 
discussed in this course.  
8.  CS-4677 (3, 2) Computer Forensics 
Covers the fundamentals of computer forensics in the context of DoN/DoD 
information operations. Students examine how information is stored and how it may be 
deliberately hidden and/or subverted. Coverage includes: practical forensic examination 
and analysis, techniques of evidence recovery, legal preparation of evidence, common 
forensic tools, the principle of original integrity, disk examination, and logging. 
Course exercises may be tailored to examine current and past attacks against the 
RCEL.  It may also be configured to determine how an internal hacker (in the form of the 
instructor or another class) might compromise the systems.  Additionally, a wealth of 
valuable forensic information will be generated every time an exercise of any scope is 
conducted. 
9. CS-4680 & 4685 (3, 0) (0, 2) Introduction to Certification and 
Accreditation and System Certification Case Studies 
This course provides an introduction to the Certification and Accreditation 
(C&A) process as applied to procurement and lifecycle management of DoD and Federal 
information systems. Topics include: principal roles, functional components, and output 
documents of the C&A process; and a comparison of the government C&A process 
specification currently in use (DITSCAP/NIACAP, FIPS, DCID 6/3) with the emerging 
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effort to produce a unified specification.  CS-4685 is part two of the two course (CS4680 
and CS4685) Certification and Accreditation course sequence. Students will investigate 
2-3 case studies of systems that have been evaluated, and then apply the lessons of 
CS4680 to make final accreditation decisions. Successful completion of this two course 
sequence leads to NSTISSI DAA and Certifier certification. 
The RCEL exercises will generally follow the development guidelines prescribed 
by DoD.  As such,  the RCEL network is subject to the DITSCAP just as any operational 
DoD network. Certification and accreditation students could construct a SSAA (System 















































IV. COMPUTER SECURITY LEARNING OBJECTIVES 
ADDRESSABLE IN THE RCEL 
A. ACADEMIC AND INDUSTRIAL STANDARDS FOR INFORMATION 
ASSURANCE 
Academia in the U.S. has traditionally followed the recommendations of IEEE 
(Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers) or the ACM (Association for Computing 
Machines) in setting up educational programs in computer science.   
Unfortunately, there is no generally accepted standard for computer security 
education.  In fact, except as integrated into the ACM/IEEE [COM03] guidelines, there 
are no published standards for computer security education at any academic level.   
There are several published standards specific for training in information security.  
Among the most useful are the National Security Telecommunications and Information 
Systems Security Instruction (NSTISSI ) standards: 
• NSTISSI No. 4011 - National Training Standard for Information Systems 
Security (INFOSEC) Professionals, dated 20 June 1994  
• NSTISSI No. 4012 - National Training Standard for Designated 
Approving Authority (DAA), dated August 1997  
• NSTISSI No. 4013 - National Training Standard for System 
Administration in Information Systems Security, dated August 1997  
• NSTISSI No. 4014 - National Training Standard for Information Systems 
Security Officers (ISSO), dated August 1997 
• NSTISSI No. 4015 - National Training Standard for Systems Certifiers, 
dated December 2000 
Other training standards exist for computer security.  The most widely recognized 
is CISSP (Certified Information System Security Professional) managed by (ISC)2 
(https://www.isc2.org/cgi-bin/index.cgi).  CISSP has categorized computer security into 
10 domains: 
1. Access Control Systems and Methodology 
2. Applications and Systems Development 
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3. Business Continuity Planning 
4. Cryptography  
5. Law, Investigation and Ethics 
6. Operations Security  
7. Physical Security 
8. Security Architecture and Models 
9. Security Management Practices 
10. Telecommunications, Network and Internet Security 
The ISC2 and other commercial entities provide training to the CISSP standard 
and categorize their courses by these domains.  The CISSP standards are intended to 
apply strictly at a practical, commercial level.  Therefore, theory of operating systems, 
automata, formal methods and other more academically oriented topics are not included.   
Each of the above organizations provides guidance in developing training courses.  
The focus areas and demarcations between topics provided by each is helpful in 
developing courses and creating learning objectives for IA training. 
A learning objective is a brief, clear statement of what the student should achieve 
as a result of some learning activity. It should link the learning to successful completion 
of  assigned tasks.  A well-written learning objective is specific and measurable.  It forms 
the basis for the training and evaluation. Learning achieved in laboratory-based activities 
enhances student retention and comprehension [DAL01].  Hill Carver et al. [HIL01], 
stated: 
The use of [a] dedicated security laboratory as a mechanism for 
supporting active learning was very beneficial.  Without exception, the 
black teams report that the ability to implement and attempt penetrations 
elevated their learning above that possible with lectures. 
Further supporting this viewpoint, Irvine [IRV01] stated: 
The educational process (for computer security) will be a mix of 
theory and practice, lecture and lab, so a class might consist almost  
 entirely of laboratory exercises or have very few.  Certain concepts lend 
themselves to laboratory exercises, while others are best taught at the 
blackboard. 
When designing courses, instructors use many methods to develop comprehensive   
learning objectives.  An important concept in designing learning objectives is to keep the 
knowledge and experience level of the students clearly in focus.  Older[OLD01] 
proposed an outcome-based model, “No single curriculum can possibly address all of 
Information Assurance: concentrating on the desired educational outcomes helped us 
determine how to structure our program.” When designing courses, both the current level 
of expertise and the desired level are critical.  The learning objectives must collectively 
indicate how the student reaches the next higher level.   
Learning objectives are achieved through student activities.  For this work, we are 
specifically interested in those activities that take can place in the RCEL environment.  In 
the next section, an examination of those activities is presented.  
B. LEARNING ACTIVITIES SUPPORTED IN THE RECONFIGURABLE 
CYBER-EXERCISE LABORATORY 
The RCEL can initially be thought of as an equipment warehouse.  Thus, all 
aspects of creating a network still apply.  The only action not undertaken is acquisition.  
In Figure 6, the three-step DoD life cycle is shown with the more commercially oriented 
six-step approach super-imposed near the bottom by this author for comparison.  The 
center bar of the figure simply shows that for a DoD system, certification and 
accreditation activities are on-going throughout the system life cycle. 
 
Figure 6. The DoD vs. Commercial Life Cycle 
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Activities in the RCEL follow the life cycle through all phases.  High level 
activities derived from the RCEL include; needs analysis, concept development,  
preliminary design, implementation, testing and operation.  In addition, the RCEL would 
include post-existential or post-exercise activities. 
For clarification of activities supported in a RCEL, a walk through of a mock 
inter-scholastic competition exercise might prove useful.  In the mock exercise, UoN 
(University of Nowhere) has asked the Naval Postgraduate School to participate in a 
cyber defense exercise in the Fall quarter (Oct. to Dec).  
The Spring quarter courses begin exercise preparation.  Appropriate on-going 
classes prepare a preliminary RCEL design and assesses the functionality needed.  A 
network security class or equivalent course assesses the security requirements and 
designs security strategies for the various components.  A computer forensics class might 
prepare the data-collection mechanisms for the lab exercise.   
During the summer, the designs prepared by various classes are implemented.  
When the exercise quarter begins, many classes become involved in preparing and 
engaging in the exercise.  Examples classes (from the NPS curriculum) that may be 
involved include; Network Security, Network Vulnerability Assessment, C&A, Secure 
Management of Systems, Computer Forensics, Advanced Topics in Computer Security 
and Introduction to IA.  
At a high level, many learning activities and teaching opportunities took place. 
Critical thinking and problem analysis were required to solve a set of real challenges. 
Experiential learning took place in determining the scope of the pending exercise and 
determining functionality needed.  Critical learning activities included: preparing a 
network design within exercise and equipment constraints, providing network 
connectivity, optimizing space utilization, etc.  Students gained experience creating a 
security strategy that meets the threat or attack posture posed by the exercise.   
When building a network within DoD, all organizations must comply with DoD 
directive 8500.1 section 5.10.5, which directs heads of DoD components to; “Identify and 
include IA requirements in the design, acquisition, installation, operation, upgrade or 
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replacement of all DoD information systems for which they have responsibility.”  The 
RCEL at any DoD organization will also be instrumental in instructing students regarding 
compliance with that directive, and perhaps even to exceed these mandated security 
minimums.   Compliance with DoD directives is assured through certification and 
accreditation . 
There is an opportunity to perform C&A tasks including compliance with 
DITSCAP (DoD Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation 
Process).  The C&A students gained experience constructing and maintaining the SSAA 
(System Security Authorization Agreement) which is the primary documentation 
demonstrating how the network meet all DoD requirements. Learning took place 
interconnecting equipment, testing operation and configuring the various physical 
properties of the network.  Exercise participants gained knowledge of implementing and 
maintaining network services like FTP, DNS, Web, etc. 
Experience and learning took place by hardening and testing the systems 
according to the security plan adopted.  Data collection techniques to capture and 
preserve exercise activities was useful.  The forensics students also gained experience 
analyzing the forensic data gathered.  Finally, students gained experience monitoring the 
operation of a functioning network.   
 
C. SPECIFIC LEARNING OBJECTIVES RELATED TO THE 
RECONFIGURABLE CYBER-EXERCISE LABORATORY 
Teaching of computer security occurs on many levels, see Figure 7.  It is 
instructive as it clearly shows the layers of education in the realm of security.  The NPS 
RCEL is intended for use at a postgraduate school, but there are equally practical 
applications at the commercial training level as well.  The learning objectives in this 
section can be adapted to coursework at any level.  With large aspects of information 
assurance at the applied level (as is the case for all of computer science), practical aspects 
of the field are worthy of classroom time. 
 The educational outcomes (of security education) must address 
security needs consistent with the security challenges encountered by 
graduates in their professional roles. Irvine [IRV05]. 
 
The learning objectives presented allow easy creation of evaluation tools (tests) to 
assess student achievement.  A pedagogical note, the learning objectives follow Bloom’s 
taxonomy [BLO02, BLO01] for categorizing learning and learning domains.  Bloom’s 

















Table 4.  Listing of The Naval Postgraduate School IA Courses 
 
ID Description 
C-1 CS-3600 – IA, Intro to Computer Security 
C-2 CS-3670 – IA, Management of Secure Systems 
C-3 CS-3675 – Network Vulnerability Assessment 
C-4 CS-3690 – Network Security 
C-5 CS-4600 – Secure Systems 
C-6 CS-4603 – Database Security 
C-7 CS-4605 – Security Policies, Models and Formal Methods 
C-8 CS-4614 – Advanced Topics in Computer Security 
C-9 CS-4677 – Computer Forensics 
C-10 CS-4680 & 4685 – Intro to C&A  and Case Studies 
The reader may freely adopt these learning objectives for courses or training 
performed at their own RCEL facility.  Each learning objective is mapped to one or more 
NPS courses that was described earlier in this document.  The learning objectives are 
further categorized into five basic areas; computer laboratory skills, networking, analysis, 
security and leadership.   
All of the learning objectives are accomplished in the course of the advanced 
exercise Scenarios III, IV, V & VI discussed later in this work.   
1. Computer Laboratory Skills 
LO-1. After completing indoctrination to the RCEL, the student will be able to 
identify all RCEL stations and describe their functions.   
Naval Postgraduate School Courses: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-8, C-9, C-10 
LO-2. After a period of discovery learning, when assigned to a RCEL station, the 
student will be able to: 
a. of the RCEL.Describe the functional significance of the station 
b. Implement the function(s) required of the station within the constraints  
Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-3, C-4, C-9 
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LO-3. The student will learn the correct operation of systems employed in the 
RCEL and be able to demonstrate that ability.   
Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-5, C-8, C-10 
LO-4. After participation in any phase of the RCEL implementation the student 
will be able to identify each component of the implemented LAN and be 
able to relate that component to corresponding layers of the ISO networking 
model.  
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-9, C-10 
LO-5. After familiarization with the RCEL network, the student will be able to 
interpret the RCEL network diagrams and verify the presence of each 
system component.  
Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-4, C-5, C-6, C-8, C-10 
LO-6. After participating in a RCEL exercise, the student will gain an increased 
knowledge of potential security issues.  The student will be able to 
demonstrate this by articulating possible variations and extensions on her 
RCEL experiences.  
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-7, C-8, C-10 
2. Networks 
LO-7. After receiving introductory training in the RCEL, the student will be able 
to describe the topology of the RCEL as implemented.  
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-4, C-10 
LO-8. After implementing the network specification for the RCEL the student will 
be able to discuss the use of VLAN technology and the implications in 
active networks. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-2, C-3, C-4, C-9 
LO-9. Given that the student was assigned to the firewall, router or switch station 
during an exercise, the student will be able to demonstrate a working 
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knowledge of the operating system interface for the device and articulate 
the configuration process for these devices 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-10 
LO-10. After training in the current configuration of the RCEL the student will be 
able to articulate the scheme of IP addressing implemented. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-9, C-10 
LO-11. After advanced training and practice on actual machines, the student will be 
able to do security related configuration operations on routers and switches. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-4, C-10 
LO-12. After a complete exercise the student will be able to recognize the 
symptoms of a system under attack or one that has been compromised. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-6, C-9, C-10 
LO-13. After participating in a RCEL exercise the student will be able to 
interconnect equipment using Ethernet cabling and be able to identify 
appropriate jacks, plugs and cable types. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-4 
LO-14. After completing the analysis and design of a RCEL topology, the student 
will be able to describe the AAA(this is Cisco specific, authentication, 
authorization, and accounting) scheme and articulate how it is implemented. 
Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-6, C-7, C-8, C-9, 
C-10 
LO-15. After a complete exercise the student will be able to discuss and articulate 
such networking concepts DHCP, PDC/BDC, DNS, VLAN, etc., and how 
each is manifested in the current configuration. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-4, C-6, C-10 
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LO-16. Before beginning work in the RCEL but after some appropriate classroom 
training, the student will demonstrate an understanding of VPN technology.  
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-4 
LO-17. After appropriate instruction the student will be able to demonstrate in the 
RCEL proficiency and correct analysis of the results obtained using 
rudimentary networking tools such ping, trace route, etc. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4 
LO-18. The student will be able to correctly interpret results obtained in the RCEL 
when using network tools such as ping, trace route, nslookup, etc. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-3, C-4, C-9 
3. Security  
LO-19. Upon completion of a RCEL exercise the student will be able to: 
a) analyze vulnerability exploits used  
b) discuss their effectiveness 
c) interpolate how these exploits might affect a “real” network 
d) prioritize the risks and vulnerabilities of the system 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-3, C-4, C-7, C-8, C-10 
LO-20. At the conclusion of a RCEL exercise the student will be able to analyze 
and evaluate the security plan that was implemented and recognize the 
strengths and weaknesses of that plan. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-4, C-6, C-10 
LO-21. After appropriate coursework in IA, the student will be able to detail the 
security requirements for an implementation of the RCEL. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-6, C-9, C-10 
LO-22. Given a security plan for the RCEL, the student will be able to assess the 
plan and take an active role in the implementation of the plan. 
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 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-4, C-10 
LO-23. Upon completion of the RCEL design the student will be able to discuss the 
defensive posture of the proposed network design. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-4, C-10 
LO-24. Upon completion of the design and implementation of the network the 
student will be able to demonstrate and discuss each of the four areas of 
security present in the RCEL; confidentiality, integrity, authenticity and 
availability. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-4, C-10 
4. Analysis 
LO-25. After participating in a RCEL exercise the student will be able to recognize 
and describe obvious security flaws in the network design. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-4, C-8, C-9, C-10 
LO-26. When the RCEL is used in conjunction with the computer forensics course, 
the student will, upon completion of an exercise, be able to perform basic 
forensic analysis on compromised systems. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-4, C-9 
LO-27. The student will be able to discuss how to translate her experience into real 
network environments. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-4, C-10 
LO-28. After implementing a RCEL design the student will be able to articulate 
how cryptography is used in the network. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-1, C-8, C-9 
5. Leadership 
LO-29. After managing a RCEL station through an exercise scenario, the student 
will be able to analyze, test and confirm the functionality of that station. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-2, C-3, C-4, C-7, C-9, C-10 
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LO-30. Upon completion of the design phase of a RCEL exercise the student will 
be able to develop an implementation plan describing the activities needed 
to complete the implementation. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-8, C-10 
LO-31. Upon completion of the design phase of a RCEL exercise the student will 
be able to demonstrate that the final design meets the exercise requirements. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-10 
LO-32. Prior to initiating an exercise, the student will be able to assess the readiness 
of the network and specifically the stations to which they are assigned. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-4, C-5, C-7, C-8, C-10 
LO-33. Upon completion of an exercise the student will be able to verify the utility 
of pre-existing network security checklists. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-4, C-10 
LO-34. After implementation of a RCEL topology the student will be able to 
discuss the process of implementation and articulate mistakes that were 
made, delays that were suffered and ways the process might be improved. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-10 
LO-35. After familiarization with the RCEL and in conjunction with the secure 
management of systems class the student will be able to assess the security 
and business continuity posture of the current topology. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-2, C-10 
LO-36. Upon completion of any phase of the RCEL lifecycle the student will be 
able to discuss team leadership and articulate learning related to team 
management and conduct. 
 Naval Postgraduate School courses: C-10 
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LO-37. After completing a RCEL exercise, the student will be able to read, interpret 
and manage the implementation of a network security plan. 
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V. EXAMPLE CYBER-EXERCISE SCENARIOS 
The primary function of the RCEL is to provide an enabling technology for inter-
organization training and cyber defense exercises.  In this chapter, six possible scenarios 
are created.  In designing each scenario and the associated network topology, design 
principles first codified by Saltzer and Schroeder [SAL01] in their 1975 paper on 
computer protection are used.  Those principles, quoted here from the 1975 paper, are : 
• Economy of Mechanism: The protection mechanism should have a simple 
and small design.  
• Fail-safe Defaults: The protection mechanism should deny access by 
default, and grant access only when explicit permission exists.  
• Complete Mediation: The protection mechanism should check every 
access to every object.  
• Open Design: The protection mechanism should not depend on attackers 
being ignorant of its design to succeed.  It may however be based on the 
attacker's ignorance of specific information such as passwords or cipher 
keys.  
• Separation of Privilege: The protection mechanism should grant access 
based on more than one piece of information.  
• Least Privilege: The protection mechanism should force every process to 
operate with the minimum privileges needed to perform its task.  
• Least Common Mechanism: The protection mechanism should be shared 
as little as possible among users.  
 As each scenario is developed and a network designed and built, a security plan 
will need to be developed.  Creating a security plan is difficult and time consuming. 
Often, it is best to use a guide or template and tailor it to the specific needs of the network 
being protected.  Extensive research has not turned up a better general guide for building 
a security plan than the template provided by NIST.  In Appendix C the NIST template 
for security plans for both major application and general support systems is presented. 
Reconfiguring the RCEL for alternate scenarios involves a specific set of tasks.  It 
is likely that changing scenarios also means changing equipment, software, people and 
connections.  This may entail additional, unplanned activities.  For example, when one 
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group of students finishes a scenario exercise, the next group may discover the passwords 
to the routers and switches are no longer available.  Most router and switch passwords 
can be reset or recovered if the operator is familiar with the proper techniques and has 
physical access to the devices.  Resetting lost passwords on Cisco routers [CIS04]  takes 
only a few minutes, but involves being able to cycle the power and connect a terminal to 
the device so a configuration register can be reset.   
Another issue is upgrades to operating systems and applications.  Doing upgrades 
between exercises is ideal.  When an exercise is in progress and the network completely 
isolated  upgrades are far more difficult.  A related issue is licensing.  Before deploying a 
new configuration the area manager must be sensitive to any licensing issues.   
Of course the most serious and critical issues relate to network security.  It is 
imperative that all connections are checked.  Verify that  the RCEL is not accidentally or 
covertly connected to the internet. 
Each scenario will include a design, a set of activities, and an appropriate network 
configuration.  For each exercise, chronological lists of activities are provided.  Each 
activity has a list of the appropriate references and an additional reference to the 
appropriate learning objectives defined in chapter IV.  To assist the reader, the L.O.s are 
further designated G, N, S, A or L (General Skills, Networking Skills, Security, Analysis 
or Leadership, respectively) according to the category in which they are found.  For 
example, 1G, is learning objective 1, General Skills.  Since the L.O.s are themselves 
cross-referenced to NPS courses, it is now possible to trace an activity in the RCEL to a 
learning objective, a useful reference, and an appropriate class.  There is, of course, a 
great deal of overlap. 
A.  SCENARIO I - LOCAL ONLY 
1. The Design 
 In this scenario no outside organization is involved.  The VPN is inactive and the 
RCEL is effectively air-gapped form any Internetworking connectivity. 
  
Figure 8.  Scenario I Configuration 
Figure 8, depicts a simple scenario.  When the RCEL is operated in this way, the 
connection to the border router (and VPN) is disconnected.  An effective way to 
configure the network may be using VLAN technology.  Here the central switch, the 
Cisco 4224, ‘becomes’ the “internet,” providing routing and interconnectivity between 
the networks. 
Each of the areas, attacker and defender, are configured as VLANS. Configuring 
VLANs on the Cisco router is relatively easy.  In Figure 9, the concept of two VLANs 
connected to a single switching element is shown.  In Scenario I, we disregard the 
connection to the router which has been disabled or turned off. A router interface can be 




Figure 9.  VLAN conceptual diagram from the Cisco Online Documentation  
  (CDROM)[CIS01] 
 
Figure 9 shows three computers on each VLAN, but there could be as few 
as one, or as many as desired, constrained only by the maximum number of hosts 
that the switch can manage.   
To create a Vlan, use the IOS command:  “set Vlan Vlan-num Vlan-
name.”  Thus, the command: set Vlan 77 defender, would create the Vlan with 
number 77 and the name “defender.”  Once the VLANs are created and properly 
configured, (See Cisco Online Documentation for all Cisco references and 
suggested configurations) the switch’s currently running configuration file will 
contain an entry similar to: 
interface Vlan 77  
ip address 10.1.100.1 255.255.255.0 
ip access-group 101 in 
ip access-group 102 out 
interface Vlan 42 




ip access-group 102 in 
ip access-group 101 out 
 
Note in the listings above, the lines that refer to IP access-groups.  These lines 
refer to access lists, specifically access lists 101 and 102 which provide layer 3 and/or 4 
filtering at the switch.  The exact content of such lists would be based on the specific 
network and would be created at the time the VLAN is configured.  The applied access 
lists control the type of packets permitted or blocked at the VLAN interface (either in-
bound or out-bound) by selecting packets for filtering based on source or destination 
address, port number, protocol, connection state and packet fragmentation.  This 
capability further strengthens the VLAN by providing isolation and protection specific to 
the needs of that network segment.  
These configuration entries reflect the creation of two VLANs, 77 and 42.  Cisco 
VLAN numbers are restricted to numbers between 2 to 1001.  Other numbers are 
reserved for use by other functionality of the switch. 
Once the VLANs exist, the switch’s physical ports, into which the computers are 
connected with standard Cat5 RJ45 terminated cables, must be associated with the 
appropriate VLAN.  The configuration entries below reflect that physical ports 22, 23 and 
24 on the switch are associated with VLAN 77. The line “switchport access vlan 77” 
shows the association.  The line “interface FastEthernet5/22” identifies physical port 22 
on module 5 that will have one of the computers plugged into it.  Each port would have a 
configuration script similar to:  
interface FastEthernet5/22 
 no ip address 
 duplex auto 
 speed auto 
 switchport access vlan 77 
 snmp trap link-status 
 no cdp enable 
In a like manner, ports 19, 20 and 21 on module 5 will be associated with VLAN 
42.  The switch needs little other configuration beyond the normal administrative tasks.  
IP address filters, ACLs, etc., will vary with each organization and exercise.  The intent 
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of this work; however, is not to teach Cisco switch configuration, but to demonstrate a 
possible configuration for Scenario I.  A source of information is the Cisco configuration 
guides which can be found at:  
 http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/product/software/ios120/12cgcr/. 
The physical interconnections allow the PCs to send packets to the network (see 
the appropriate documentation for the PC or device in use) and to the appropriate 
port/VLAN of the switch.  
Looking at the attacker LAN, the activities of the attacker will most likely follow 
a distinct pattern.  Such as that outlined by McClure [MCC01].  
2. RCEL Activities for Scenario I 
So, the activities of this scenario for the attacker are: 
1. Define the needs of the attacker side of the LAN [MCC01, NAT17, 
MAN01]  
{L.O.s:  6G, 11N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 19S, 20S, 21S, 23S, 24S, 25A, 
27A, 28A, 31L, 32L, 34L} 
2. Connect the hardware [COM02, CIS01, DEF01, NAT04, NAT08, LAR01, 
NAT17, ROS01] 
{L.O.s:  1G, 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 10N, 13N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29L, 30L, 34L} 
3. Configure and test  the VLAN on the switch [COM02, CIS01, DEF01, 
NAT04, NAT08, LAR01, NAT17, ROS01] 
{L.O.s:  5G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 22S, 23S, 27A, 30L, 31L 
32L, 33L, 34L, 36L, 37L} 
4. Configure and test the workstations [SAN01, COM02, DEP01, NAT16, 
NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, NAT09, LIT01, RUS01, FRA01, POS01, 
BER02, LON01, ROS01, DAY01, KEL01, GER01] 
{L.O.s:  1-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 13N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 20-24S, 25A, 
27A, 29-37L} 
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5. Define the attack goals and formulate an attack plan [MCC01, MAN01] 
{L.O.s:  1G, 4G, 5G, 6G, 9N, 14N, 15-18N, 19-24S, 25-28A, 30L, 33L, 
34-37L}  
6. Acquire the “hacking” tools and exploits needed [MCC01] 
{L.O.s:  6G, 12N, 14N, 19S, 24S, 25-28A, 30L,33L, 34-36L} 
7. Engage in the attack following McClure’s 9 steps [MCC01] 
{L.O.s:  3G, 4G, 6G, 7-18N, 19-24S, 25-28A, 33-36L},  
8. Disengage the attack[MCC01, LAR01, NAT17, DAY01, KEL01] 
{L.O.s:  12N, 13N, 17N, 34L} 
9. Analyze the success/failure of the techniques and tools employed[DEP02, 
MAN01, DAY01] 
{L.O.s:  6G, 7-18N, 19-24S, 25-28A, 29-37L} 
Looking back at the learning objectives, this scenario accommodates all of the 
learning objectives listed in Chapter IV, although in a more limited way.  Due to the 
limited scope and small scale of this scenario, some L.O.s are covered in far more depth 
than others. 
Now let’s look at the defender VLAN.  Major activities on this side are: 
1. Define the defensive needs of the network [SAN01, DEP02, FRA01, 
NAT17]  
{L.O.s:  1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 34L, 
35L, 36L, 37L} 
2. Write a security plan [DEP03, SAN01, LEI02, NAT18, DEP01, NAT16, 
NAT12, NAT04, KEN01, NAT17] 
{L.O.s:  1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
3. Configure the VLAN on the switch [COM02, CIS01, DEF01, NAT04, 
NAT08, LAR01, NAT17, ROS01] 
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{L.O.s:  5G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 22S, 23S, 27A, 30L, 31L 
32L, 33L, 34L, 36L, 37L} 
4. Connect the hardware [COM02, CIS01, DEF01, NAT04, NAT08, LAR01, 
NAT17,ROS01] 
{L.O.s:  1G, 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 10N, 13N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29L, 30L, 34L} 
5. Configure, connect and test the workstations including security [SAN01, 
COM02, DEP01, NAT16, NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, NAT09, LIT01, 
RUS01, FRA01, POS01, BER02, LON01, ROS01, DAY01,KEL01, 
GER01] 
{L.O.s:  1-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 13N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 20-24S, 25A, 
27A, 29-37L} 
6. Implement and test the security plan including incident response and 
operational continuity [DEP03, SAN01, LEI02, NAT18, DEP01, NAT16, 
NAT13, NAT12, NAT04, KEN01, NAT17, DAY01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16-18N, 21-24S, 28A, 
32L, 34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
 
7. Defend the net [SAN01, IRV01, HIL01, BIS01, MAY01, NAT18, 
COM02, PFL01, NAT15, NAT16, NAT12, NAT03, NAT06, NAT10, 
LIT01, RUS01, MCC01, FRA01, NAT17, MAN01, LON01, ROS01, 
KEL01] 
{L.O.s: 3-6G, 7-18N, 21-24S, 26A, 28A, 29-37L}  
8. Disengage the exercise [MCC01, LAR01, NAT17, DAY01, KEL01] 
{L.O.s:  12N, 13N, 17N, 34L} 
9. Analyze the success/failure of the security plan [FRA01, NAT17, 
MAN01] 
{L.O.s:  6G, 7-18N, 19-24S, 25-28A, 29-37L} 
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10. Analyze (forensically) any penetrations or collected evidentiary data. 
[MCC01, FRA01, NAT17, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 8N, 9N, 12N, 14N, 19S, 20S, 23S, 24S, 34L, 36L, 37L} 
Scenario I is closely akin to a traditional lab exercise.  This network may be 
configured in a day, the remaining aspects of the scenario done in a day or over a period 
of a week or more.   
VLANs allow this scenario to be on-going while other activities are taking place 
on the switch.  The Cisco 4224 used in the Naval Postgraduate School RCEL, is a 24 port 
switch.  Allotting 6 ports to this scenario allows four separate Scenario I activities to take 
place simultaneously. 
B.  SCENARIO II -  LIMITED INTERACTION DEFENSE ONLY 
1. The Design 
This scenario provides a defensive exercise configuration.  Configure the RCEL 
to appear as a “normal” small organization’s network.  In this exercise, a minimal amount 
of equipment is set up.  The RCEL network is hardened according to a pre-existing 
security plan [DEP01, NAT15, NAT16, NAT12, NAT10, RUS01].  But it is not too well 
hardened, however, since we actually want the attacker to succeed.  Successful attacks 
enable defenders to watch and record the attack and the progression of penetration and 
compromise. A great deal of experiential learning comes from being the victim of an 
attack [BIS01, MAY01, DAL01] (in a controlled environment). 
An agreement is made between the defending RCEL (blue team) and an external 
organization that will act as the attacker (red team).  This may be another school, another 
department, the local hacker’s club, or perhaps someone as able and sophisticated as the 
NSA or CIA.  The external organization then attacks the RCEL network and tries to gain 
access, acquire information (e.g., “capture the flag”), or disrupt operation.  This may 
involve the use of malware, back doors, denial of service, interception or any other attack 
technique.  The limitations of the attack will be set in advance by agreement between the 
defending side administrator and the attacker organization.   
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In this scenario, the VPN connects to the attacker and serves as the access 
gateway for the network.  The first router is located behind a hub (see Figure 10 below) 
allowing for an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) station to electronically monitor all 
network traffic.  The attacker is forbidden from attacking the data collection laptop (if 
detected) but the IDS is fair game.  The data collection laptop is used by an instructor or 
manager to monitor network activities or record raw traffic. 
The Scenario II configuration of the RCEL includes a router, a firewall, a switch, 
an application server, a web server and a syslog server.  Note, there is no DMZ and no 
mail server.  The application server may be running any application appropriate to the 
exercise or agreed upon by the exercise participants.  Of course, the participants may add 
features or servers as necessary to meet specific requirements.   
When deploying an IDS [CIS03], the specific implementation must be tuned for 
maximum effectiveness and to reduce false positives caused by legitimate traffic.  In 
Figure 10, the IDS is configured as a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) versus 
a Host-based Intrusion System (HIDS).  When a threat is detected the IDS provided 
passive notification to the administrator or other agent per the specified configuration.  
The choice of response is dependent upon the goal of the network security plan.  A NIDS 
that only records and quietly alerts can be thought of as a “silent alarm.”  
Configuring a NIDS requires careful consideration and planning.  In this exercise, 
we are only interested in detection.  That is, it will be more important to allow some 
attack traffic in than to automatically “shun” or filter any hosts detected as the origin of 
the attack.  This may be true in some operational networks as well.   
  
Figure 10. Scenario II - Defense Only 
The Cisco Pix firewall, along with the router filters form the primary perimeter 
defense of the network.  This exercise assumes an attacker will attempt penetration, 
however, a reasonable but soft perimeter defense should be in place initially to provide  
educational strength and completeness to the exercise.  If the attacker fails to penetrate 
the perimeter after some previously negotiated timeframe, the perimeter defense will be 




2. Network Design Elements 
The most critical aspect of Scenario II (and also Scenarios III, IV, V and VI) 
network is the use of the VPN to connect to the external organization.  VPNs use several 
technologies including PPTP (Point to Point Tunneling Protocol), L2TP (Layer Two 
Tunneling Protocol), or even SSL (Secure Socket Layer) and SSH (Secure Shell).  Each 
technology has pros and cons.  Today’s more robust VPN appliances and software, like 
the Cisco Pix-506 used in the NPS RCEL, support IPSec.   
Of all the VPN technologies available, IPSec is the technology of choice for the 
support of RCEL exercises wherein the opposing networks are connected across a shared, 
public network. The reason for this is twofold. First, IPSec is employed at the network 
layer; thus every application that participants may want to involve in any particular 
exercise scenario can be encapsulated in the encryption tunnel as the application payload 
(OSI layer 7) is passed down to the IPSec (OSI layer 3) processing module. Second, 
when employed in tunnel mode on a gateway machine that serves as the only link 
between the RCEL network and the external public network, IPSec will leave all of the 
original RCEL machines’ IP information intact, and simply encapsulate the traffic in a 
new IP header. Such usage of IPSec in tunnel mode provides both packet encryption and 
network address translation (NAT) for the private IP space that is likely being used in the 
RCEL.  
IPSec [KEN01, VPN01] technology as described in RFCs 2401, 2406, 2407, 
2408, 2409, 2547, and 3193 allows for the establishment of an encrypted “tunnel” or 
connection between hosts.  RFC-2401 defines IPSec as: 
IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a 
system to select required security protocols, determine the algorithm(s) to 
use for the service(s), and put in place any cryptographic keys required to 
provide the requested services.  IPsec can be used to protect one or more 
"paths" between a pair of hosts, between a pair of security gateways, or 
between a security gateway and a host.  (The term "security gateway" is 
used throughout the IPsec documents to refer to an intermediate system 
that implements IPSec protocols.  For example, a router or a firewall 
implementing IPsec is a security gateway.) 
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Note that anyone attempting to set up a VPN must familiarize themselves with all 
pertinent RFCs and the documentation provided by the manufacturer of the VPN 
products in use. 
An excellent reference for VPN information is the VPNC (VPN Consortium,  
http://www.vpnc.org).  The VPNC defines three types of VPN technologies[VPN01]; 
Secure VPN, Trusted VPN, and Hybrid VPN.  The RCEL must use a secure VPN 
technology.  Secure VPN technologies include IPsec with encryption in either tunnel or 
transport mode or IPsec inside layer 2 tunneling protocol (L2TP as described in RFC-
3193).  The exact manner in which the VPN is established depends entirely on the 
software or hardware used.  Some VPN systems have very nice GUI interfaces that allow 
the administrator to point and click all the settings necessary.  On the other end of the 
spectrum are the command line systems requiring a thorough knowledge of the product 
and VPN technology to correctly configure. 
In the RCEL, the VPN station is critical and must be assigned to people who are 
interested, knowledgeable (or want to become so) and can be trusted to respect the 
seriousness and importance of this duty. 
In the network diagram shown in Figure 10, a second hub is located between the 
firewall and the switch.  This is considered “invisible” to the network and is used only to 
permit sniffing, monitoring and other vulnerability assessment and exercise specific 
activities. 
Within the network, tools like TripWire can be deployed.  Tripwire (an open 
source solution) monitors changes to files residing on  Linux systems (the commercially 
available version works on Unix and Windows). The program detects changes in key 
attributes of files that should not change, including binary signature, size, etc. 
Commercial versions are available.   
Nessus is a publicly available tool that monitors and checks for security 
vulnerabilities on a network.  More information can be found at http://www.nessus.org.  
It is a good idea to put a sniffer in place as well.  A good sniffing product that is freely 
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available is Ethereal (http://www.ethereal.com ).  This tool lets the user see incoming 
packets in real time and dissect them into their component parts for easy reading.   
There is significant debate in the IA community about the value of IDS and the 
role it should play in overall security.  It is not within the scope of this work to solve this 
debate, only to make the reader aware.  IDS can be simplistic (a sniffer) or more 
sophisticated as in the Cisco IDS 4250 Appliance Sensor.  The Cisco marketing literature 
claims the IDS-4250 “raises the performance bar for high-throughput gigabit protection 
in a performance-upgradeable IDS chassis.”  The importance of the IDS and sniffer to the 
RCEL is student awareness and familiarity.   
In Figure 11, a capture of a small part of a session is shown.  The highlighted line 
in the top area selects a particular packet.  In the middle area, the packet’s structure is 
broken out and in the lower segment the hex is highlighted that relates to the particular 
protocol selected in the center frame.  With this tool, users quickly see what is coming 
into the network and what ports and protocols are in use or requested. 
  
Figure 11. Ethereal Capture  
 
3. RCEL Activities for Scenario II 
The activities associated with this configuration are similar to those in Scenario I 
for the defender side with some additions. 
1. Define the needs and scope of the network IAW the planned exercise 
[IRV03, HIL01, LAN01, BIS01, MAY01, 42, MCC01, MAN01, 
HOF01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
2. Write a security plan [DEP03, SAN01, LEI02, NAT18, DEP01, 
NAT16, NAT12, NAT04, KEN01, NAT17] 
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{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16N, 21-24S, 28A, 
32L, 34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
3. Connect the hardware (without connecting the VPN to the internet or 
the router) [COM02, CIS01, DEF01, NAT12, NAT04, NAT08, 
LAR01, NAT17, ROS01, LEI01] 
4. {L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 10N, 13N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29L, 30L, 
34L} 
5. Configure the switch as needed [CIS01, LAR01, LON01] 
{L.O.s:  2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 8-11N, 13-15N, 17N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29-
37L}  
6. Configure and test the workstations including security per the security 
plan [SAN01, COM02, DEP01, NAT16, NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, 
NAT09, LIT01, RUS01, FRA01, POS01, BER02, LON01, ROS01, 
DAY01, KEL01, GER01] 
{L.O.s:  1-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 13N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 20-24S, 25A, 
27A, 29-37L} 
7. Implement and test the remainder of the security plan including 
incident response and operational continuity [SAN01, NAT13, NAT17, 
DAY01] 
{L.O.s:  1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16-18N, 21-24S, 28A, 
32L, 34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
8. Implement and test the vulnerability assessment and IDS stations 
[NAT06] 
{L.O.s:  2G, 4G, 6G, 12N, 14N, 20S, 23S, 24S, 28A, 29L, 34L, 37L} 
9. Configure the VPN according to the security plan and the requirements 
of the local network administrator [CIS01, KEN01, LAR01] 
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{L.O.s:  1G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 9N, 10N, 11N, 14-18N, 23S, 24S, 27A, 28A, 
29-34L} 
10. Test the VPN with the attacking organization without the RCEL router 
connected [CIS01, KEN01, LAR01] 
{L.O.s:  2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L} 
11. Connect the RCEL router when the exercise is ready to begin [NAT12, 
ELE01] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 6G, 9N, 10N, 13N, 15-18N, 23S, 24S, 29L, 31L, 32L, 
36L}  
12. Test the security of the VPN [CIS01, KEN01, LAR01, NAT17] 
{L.O.s:  2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L, 37L} 
13. Conduct the scheduled exercise [SAN01, IRV01, HIL01, BIS01, 
MAY01, NAT18, COM02, PFL01, NAT15, NAT16, NAT12, NAT03, 
NAT06, NAT10, LIT01, RUS01, MCC01, FRA01, NAT17, MAN01, 
LON01, ROS01, KEL01] 
{L.O.s:  ALL} 
14. Collect data during the exercise [MAN01] 
{L.O.s:  3G, 4G, 5G, 9-12N, 14N, 15-18N, 19-24S, 29L, 32L, 35L} 
15. Disconnect the router and VPN when the exercise is concluded[CIS01, 
KEN01, LAR01] 
{L.O.s:  8N, 12N, 13N, 17N, 18N, 19S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 33L, 34L, 
36L} 
16. Analyze the success/failure of the security plan [FRA01, NAT17, 
MAN01] 
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{L.O.s:  6G, 7-18N, 19-24S, 25-28A, 29-37L} 
17. Analyze (forensically) any successful attacks. [MCC01, FRA01, 
NAT17, MAN01] 
{L.O.s:  8N, 9N, 12N, 14N, 19S, 20S, 23S, 24S, 34L, 36L, 37L} 
In Scenario II, all learning objectives for the RCEL are available to instructors 
and students except those specifically related to attack techniques.  This scenario is an 
excellent way to start a RCEL and to safely demonstrate the virtues of this type of 
education with minimal risk of some unfortunate incident taking place.  This scenario can 
be exciting, interesting and challenging.  If the attacker is very sophisticated, the scenario 
is enhanced.  
This exercise must provide dynamic latitude in defensive implementations as it is 
actually desirable that the attacker penetrate the defended system at some point during the 
exercise so the students can gain the experience.  Thus, if the defense is so well 
implemented the attackers cannot penetrate, the defenders should soften it as the exercise 
progresses until the it is ultimately penetrated.  
C.  SCENARIO III – LIMITED INTERACTION ATTACK ONLY 
1. The Design 
In the opposite of Scenario II, students assume the role of attacker in Scenario III.  
Students learn a great deal about defending a network when they understand how attacks 
are mounted and carried out.  Training students to conduct attacks prepares them for 
performing vulnerability analysis is beneficial for organizations charged with such tasks.  
In Figure 12 we see an attack configuration.  Just as a hacker or group of hackers is not 
seriously concerned with the victim attacking in response, this configuration allows the 
red team (attackers) maximum freedom and minimum impedance from security 
measures.  Note, there is no firewall, no IDS, no VLANs, no authentication and so on.   
To attempt this configuration in a normal lab is very difficult because the local 
network’s security and restrictions inhibit many attacks and the use of malware.  . 
Attackers should formulate an attack plan [MCC01] and go about gathering tools 
to carry out that plan.  Some attack methods will be novel, but most will come from 
 existing sources such as “hacker” web sites.   One such site, “The Cult of the Dead Cow” 
(http://www.cultdeadcow.com) is quite useful.  Caution must be exercised when visiting 
these sites to prevent introducing malware into the research machine. 
 
Figure 12. Scenario III - Attack Configuration 
 
More reputable web sites for collecting tools include http://www.insecure.org, 
http://www.blackhat.com, http://www1.corest.com, http://www.sans.org, 
http://icat.nist.gov, http://www.hacker-tools.com and many more.   
Primary among the tools needed is Nmap.  Nmap can be freely downloaded from 
insecure.org.  There is a command line version and a GUI version.  This tool is used to 
map a network’s machines and open ports.  The documentation for Nmap states, “Nmap 
is designed to allow system administrators and curious individuals to scan large networks 
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 to determine which hosts are up and what services they are offering.” 
(http://www.insecure.org/nmap/data/nmap_manpage.html).  Red Team members are 
“curious individuals.” 
 
Figure 13. Nmap Scan Results 
 
Figure 13 shows a sample scan of a single computer.  Nmap can also be used to 
scan a range of IP addresses.  This tool is very adaptable, allowing stealth pings and 
various types of scan techniques.  SuperScan is another useful network-mapping tool and 
can be found at http://www.foundstone.com.   
Another required tool is a password cracker.  L0phtCrack (pronounced, “loft 
crack”) from @Stake is a very good tool for this purpose.  The tool can be downloaded 
 60
  61
but a license is required.  An equally effective freeware product is “john the ripper.”  The 
home page for this product is http://www.openwall.com/john.  The opening statement on 
that page describes the product thusly:  
John the Ripper is a fast password cracker, currently available for 
many flavors of Unix (11 are officially supported, not counting different 
architectures), DOS, Win32, BeOS, and OpenVMS.  Its primary purpose 
is to detect weak Unix passwords.  Besides several crypt(3) password hash 
types most commonly found on various Unix flavors, supported out of the 
box are Kerberos AFS and Windows NT/2000/XP LM hashes, plus 
several more with contributed patches. 
Perhaps the next most useful tool is Netcat.  Netcat can be found at 
http://netcat.sourceforge.net.  It is described there as: 
Netcat is a featured networking utility which reads and writes data 
across network connections, using the TCP/IP protocol.  It is designed to 
be a reliable "back-end" tool that can be used directly or easily driven by 
other programs and scripts. At the same time, it is a feature-rich network 
debugging and exploration tool, since it can create almost any kind of 
connection you would need and has several interesting built-in 
capabilities. 
One of the “interesting” capabilities Netcat has is the ability to send data across 
the net to a host and port specified.  Once a machine is penetrated, among the first tasks 
the hacker does is put Netcat on the victim machine.  It can be named anything, of course.  
A wily hacker might call it Excell.exe or Win32Filter.exe. This naming obscurity will 
probably fool most users who would not be looking for programs of this type.  If the 
program were stored in an alternate data stream [MAN01], it would be completely 
invisible to the user/owner of the victim box.   
A very comprehensive list of tools can be found at 
http://www.hackingexposed.com/tools/tools.html.  This list has been compiled by Stuart 
McClure and others at Foundstone, Inc.  
In addition to the tools of penetration and compromise, the attackers may want to 
employ malware of some sort.  “Back Orifice” is an easy tool to locate, install and use.  
“Rootkits” like “Adore” or “knark” and the many variations thereof, are readily available 
for use when attacking Linux or Unix systems.  RootKits typically use the LKM 
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(Loadable Kernel Module) capability of Unix to load and install additional functionality 
in a running kernel.  RootKits allow the attacker to add, change or delete utility programs.  
They often have stealth capability to hide their presence.  Frequently, RootKits modify 
benign utilities like chmod or ps inserting functionality desired by the attacker.   
There are thousands of other attack tools, so the attack plan should research the 
most useful and effective (and removable) for the exercise.  For ideas, exercise 
participants should refer to the NIST ICAT (the acronym no longer has specific 
definition) database for a complete description of all known exploits, viruses, Trojans, 
worms and so on.   
In addition to the aforementioned tools, a suite of tools from 
http://www.sysinternals.com is useful, well written and easily installed.  Of this group, 
the Psexec tool is especially useful.  The description provided by the vendor says, “The 
Pstools suite includes command-line utilities for listing the processes running on local or 
remote computers, running processes remotely, rebooting computers, dumping event 
logs, and more.”  Psexec allows the attacker to execute programs on the victim machine 
with the permission of the current user.  Another tool from this suite is Pspasswd.  
Pspasswd lets the attacker change an account password on a local or remote system.  The 
attacker can create batch files to run Pspasswd on computers they have penetrated and 
perform a mass change of the administrator or user passwords.   
2. RCEL Activities for Scenario III 
1. Define the needs and scope of the network [IRV03, HIL01, LAN01, 
BIS01, MAY01, 42, MCC01, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
2. Develop and write the attack plan [MCC01, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 3G, 4G, 6G, 8N-11N, 14-18N, 21-24S, 21-28A, 32-37L} 
3. Collect attack tools and exploits based on the attack plan [MCC01] 
{L.O.s: 4G, 19S, 20S, 22S, 23S, 24S, 26A, 37L} 
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4. Connect the hardware (without connecting the VPN to the internet or 
the router) [NAT12, LEI01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 10N, 13N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29L, 30L, 
34L} 
5. Configure the router and switch as needed [CIS01, LAR01, LON01] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 8-11N, 13-15N, 17N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29-
37L} 
6. Configure and test the workstations including minimal security and 
including tools specified in the attack plan [SAN01, COM02, DEP01, 
NAT16, NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, NAT09, LIT01, RUS01, FRA01, 
POS01, BER02, LON01, ROS01, DAY01, KEL01, GER01] 
{L.O.s: 1-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 13N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 20-24S, 25A, 
27A, 29-37L} 
7. Configure the VPN according to the security plan and the requirements 
of the local network administrator [CIS01, KEN01, LAR01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 9N, 10N, 11N, 14-18N, 23S, 24S, 27A, 28A, 
29-34L} 
8. Test the VPN with the victim organization without the RCEL router 
connected [KEN01, LAR01] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L} 
9. Connect the RCEL router when the exercise is ready to begin 
{L.O.s: 2G, 6G, 9N, 10N, 13N, 15-18N, 23S, 24S, 29L, 31L, 32L, 
36L} 
10. Test the security of the VPN [KEN01] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L, 37L} 
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11. Conduct the scheduled exercise [SAN01, IRV01, HIL01, BIS01, 
MAY01, NAT18, COM02, PFL01, NAT15, NAT16, NAT12, NAT03, 
NAT06, NAT10, LIT01, RUS01, MCC01, FRA01, NAT17, MAN01, 
LON01, ROS01, KEL01] 
{L.O.s: 6G, 7-18N, 19-24S, 25-28A, 29-37L} 
12. Collect data during the exercise [MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 3G, 4G, 5G, 9-12N, 14N, 15-18N, 19-24S, 29L, 32L, 35L} 
13. Disconnect the router and VPN when the exercise is concluded [CIS01, 
KEN01, LAR01] 
{L.O.s: 8N, 12N, 13N, 17N, 18N, 19S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 33L, 34L, 36L} 
14. Analyze the success/failure of the attack plan [MCC01, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 6G, 7-18N, 19-24S, 25-28A, 29-37L} 
15. Analyze all attack results [MAN01]  
{L.O.s: 8N, 9N, 12N, 14N, 19S, 20S, 23S, 24S, 34L, 36L, 37L } 
Note, if the attack strategy includes any self-replicating malware, great caution 
must be taken to prevent infection and spread among Scenario III host machines and 
inadvertent infection of other systems in the RCEL or elsewhere.  This type of activity 
highlights the importance of the VPN and air-gapped lab configuration to protect other 
resources.  That having been said, this lab configuration and exercise scenario is ideal for 
testing and evaluating the behavior of newly observed exploits and malware. 
The learning objectives achieved in this scenario lean more to the attack side.  
There are still a lot of activities in setting up networks and VPNs but the sophistication of 
the security plan and contingency/continuity planning are eliminated. 
D.  SCENARIO IV – JOINT TEACHING EXERCISE 
1. The Design 
In this exercise, two academic/training organizations agree on a set of activities 
conducted between respective RCELs.   This scenario relies on the flexibility of the  
  65
RCEL.  There is no specific network configuration of the RCEL for this scenario, rather 
there are general guidelines that can be followed to create a successful inter-organization 
exercise.   
A negotiated exercise is designed to address a particular need at a particular time. 
The participants design the RCEL to meet a mutually identified and specific training 
requirement.  An example is training a group of programmers to manage a network 
remotely.  Another example is providing lab functionality remotely to a small or poorly 
equipped organization for security training. 
Referring to Figure 4 and Figure 5, it is possible to interpolate implementations of 
the RCEL for the specific exercises being planned.  Most implementations will use 
VLANS to isolate network activity.  The ACLs written for the router and switch are 
based on the amount of interaction agreed upon by the exercise participants.  
In this scenario, a larger portion of effort will be in the analysis and design 
phases.  There are many good resources to help with design of a secure network.  One 
very useful and quick read is the NetScreen Whitepaper: Principles of Secure Network 
Design [NET01] available from http://www.netscreen.com.  NetScreen is a security-
focused manufacturer of network products and services.  Three of their guiding principles 
are; “security is a process”, “effective security is Security-in-Depth” and “if you don’t 
know what you are protecting and why, you can’t protect anything.”  The paper also 
covers seven steps to a more secure network design.   
1. Audit – Determine what is important and why. 
2. Partition – Separate the important from the unimportant. 
3. Fix – Make your default-configured systems more secure. 
4. Monitor – Add monitoring and logging systems to round out your security. 
5. Protect – Make a plan, and a contact sheet for when attacks happen. 
6. Check – Do a dry run – and attack your own network. 
7. Update – Keep current, and re-evaluate your design as things change 
With a document such as this, students have a good starting point for their work. 
 To provide added reliability, automatic failover of the routers may be desirable.  
If Cisco routers are used, as in the NPS RCEL, “hot standby routing protocol” (HSRP) is 
the proprietary Cisco protocol provided.   In Scenarios IV, V and VI the network routers 
may be configured in an HSRP configuration, as seen in the Figure 14 [CIS05]. In this 
configuration, the network requires two routers and more set-up time.  A virtual router is 
created and traffic is routed to that virtual machine.  If Router A fails, there is no 
disruption of traffic as Router B automatically continues routing traffic. 
 
Figure 14. HSRP network configuration[CIS05],  from 
http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ics/cs009.htm 
 
2. RCEL Activities for Scenario IV 
1. Determine the purpose of the exercise [SAN01, IRV01, HIL01, HIG01, 
BIS01, BIS03, MAY01, PFL01, NAT16, NAT13, NAT01, BLO02, 
CHI01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
2. Jointly define the scope and restrictions of the exercise 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 




4. Define the needs and scope of the network [IRV03, HIL01, LAN01, 
BIS01, MAY01, 42, MCC01, MAN01, HOF01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
5. Design the network configuration [SAN01, HIL01, BIS01, MAY01, 
NAT16, NAT12, NAT04, NAT05, NAT08, MCC01, NAT17, ELE01, 
MOC01, POS01, LON01, GER01, LEI01, NET01] 
{L.O.s: ALL} 
6. Write a security plan [DEP03, SAN01, LEI02, NAT18, DEP01, 
NAT16, NAT12, NAT04, KEN01, NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16N, 21-24S, 28A, 
32L, 34L, 35L, 36L, 37L } 
7. Connect the hardware (without connecting the VPN to the internet or 
the router) [NAT12, ELE01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 10N, 13N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29L, 30L, 
34L} 
8. Configure router(s) as needed [SAN01, LEI02, COM02, CIS01, 
DEP01, DEF01, NAT06, NAT10, KEN01, LAR01, NAT17, MOC01, 
POS01, BER02, LON01, ROS01, NET01] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 8-11N, 13-15N, 17N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29-
37L} 
9. Configure the switch as needed including VLANs [COM02, CIS01, 
DEF01, NAT04, NAT08, LAR01, NAT17, ROS01] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 8-11N, 13-15N, 17N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29-
37L} 
10. Configure and test the workstations including security per the security 
plan [SAN01, COM02, DEP01, NAT16, NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, 
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NAT09, LIT01, RUS01, FRA01, POS01, BER02, LON01, ROS01, 
DAY01, KEL01, GER01] 
{L.O.s: 1-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 13N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 20-24S, 25A, 
27A, 29-37L} 
11. Implement and test the remainder of the security plan including 
incident response and operational continuity [SAN01, NAT18, 
COM02, DEP02, DEP01, NAT15, NAT16, NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, 
NAT06, RUS01, NAT17, NET01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16-18N, 21-24S, 28A, 
32L, 34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
12. Implement and test the data collection stations as needed [NAT15, 
MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 1-6G, 7-11N, 13-18N, 20S, 22S, 25A, 26A, 30-32L, 35L, 37L} 
13. Configure the VPN according to the security plan and the requirements 
of the local network administrator [DEF01, NAT10, KEN01, NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 9N, 10N, 11N, 14-18N, 23S, 24S, 27A, 28A, 
29-34L} 
14. Test the VPN with the other exercise organization(s) without the RCEL 
router connected [KEN01] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L} 
15. Connect the RCEL router when the exercise is ready to begin 
{L.O.s: 2G, 6G, 9N, 10N, 13N, 15-18N, 23S, 24S, 29L, 31L, 32L, 
36L} 
16. Test the security of the VPN [NAT10, KEN01, NAT17]  
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L, 37L} 
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17. Conduct the scheduled exercise [IRV01, IRV03, HIL01, 13, 14, 15, 16, 
NAT13, BLO02, BLO01, SVI01, CHI01] 
{L.O.s:  ALL} 
18. Collect data during the exercise [NAT15, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 3G, 4G, 5G, 9-12N, 14N, 15-18N, 19-24S, 29L, 32L, 35L} 
19. Disconnect the router and VPN when the exercise is concluded[CIS01, 
KEN01, LAR01] 
{L.O.s: 8N, 12N, 13N, 17N, 18N, 19S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 33L, 34L, 36L} 
20. Analyze the success/failure of the security plan [NAT08, MAN01, 
DAY01] 
{L.O.s: 6G, 7-18N, 19-24S, 25-28A, 29-37L} 
21. Perform post-exercise forensics as needed [MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 8N, 9N, 12N, 14N, 19S, 20S, 23S, 24S, 34L, 36L, 37L} 
22. Debrief the exercise with both parties [SAN01, NAT16, NAT14, 
NAT12, NAT04, NAT05, NAT01] 
{L.O.s: 4G, 6G, 8N, 10N, 12-15N, 19S, 20S, 24S, 25-27A, 29-31L, 
33L, 36L, 37L} 
23. Document at needed [DEP02] 
{L.O.s: ALL} 
E.  SCENARIO V – EXTERNAL NETWORK VULNERABILITY 
ASSESSMENT 
1. The Design 
The RCEL may also be used by an organization as an active vulnerability 
assessment (VA) mechanism.  For example, the XYZ organization has just implemented 
a new network and has requested an assessment to see if it can be readily penetrated 
before allowing it to go “live.”  XYZ configures a VPN connection to the RCEL and the 
network vulnerability assessment class (or assigned professionals), systematically attempt 
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penetration and enumeration of XYZ’s network.  The findings may be used for student 
assessment and helping XYZ determine their level of vulnerability.   
Before the exercise is undertaken, a MOU/MOA should be negotiated and signed 
between the host RCEL and assessment target organizations.  In this exercise, the local 
RCEL becomes, in effect, a contractor to the assessment target organization.  Services 
provided depend on the specific need of the assessment target organization but must fall 
within the capability of the host RCEL and the administrative organization, e.g., NPS.   
Services most likely to be requested and most easily supported include “red team” 
activities, training, or other specific remote assessment functions.  In the discussion of 
this configuration a remote vulnerability assessment is assumed. NIST Special 
Publication 800-42 [NAT11] is an excellent guide for vulnerability assessment.  The  
document provides a good list of VA activities and tools a host RCEL might use. 
 
  
Figure 15. Scenario V - Vulnerability Assessment 
 
Figure 15 shows a possible configuration for the VA Scenario.  In this 
configuration, the security stations are restored and the workstations are dedicated to the 
task of evaluation.  Note in Figure 15 the data collection station which represents any of a 
set of equipment (for example, a logic analyzer or sniffer) or applications (for example, 
forensic data collection applications, packet capture analysis and display, …) that might 
be used in the assessment process.  In this scenario the RCEL network System 
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Administrator will want a standard compliment of network support functions 
implemented [DEP02], e.g., PDC, syslog, ghost, DNS, etc.   
Probing and testing an external network is an intentionally intrusive 
procedure[NAT11] and may follow a pattern similar to that of Scenario III 
(attacking/hacking an external network).  Major differences between Scenario III and 
Scenario V are intent (supportive versus malicious), probing with consent of the owners 
(activity step 3 below) of the network being evaluated, application of scientific method 
and the need for careful documentation including time spent, tester’s name, 
vulnerabilities found, methodologies used, etc. 
2. RCEL Activities for Scenario V 
1. Determine the purpose of the exercise [SAN01, IRV01, HIL01, HIG01, 
BIS01, BIS03, MAY01, PFL01, NAT16, NAT13, NAT01, BLO02, 
CHI01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
2. Jointly define the scope and restrictions of the exercise [DEP03, 
DEP02, NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
3. Generate MOU or MOA or other legal agreements as required 
{L.O.s: 34-37L} 
4. Define the scope of the network and identify data collection 
requirements [IRV03, HIL01, LAN01, BIS01, MAY01, NAT15, 42, 
MCC01, MAN01, HOF01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
5. Define a management plan to document time and costs 
{L.O.s: 30-37L} 
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6. Begin documenting all management requested information, i.e., costs, 
time, contacts, signatures, etc 
{L.O.s: 27A, 35-37L} 
7. Design the network configuration [SAN01, HIL01, BIS01, MAY01, 
NAT16, NAT12, NAT04, NAT05, NAT08, MCC01, NAT17, ELE01, 
MOC01, POS01, LON01, GER01, LEI01, NET01] 
{L.O.s: ALL} 
8. Write a security plan for properly defending the host network [DEP03, 
SAN01, LEI02, NAT18, DEP01, NAT16, NAT12, NAT04, KEN01, 
NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16N, 21-24S, 28A, 
32L, 34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
9. Get signed authorization to proceed from appropriate 
command/management levels [DEP02] 
{L.O.s: 27A, 35-37L} 
10. Connect the hardware (without connecting the VPN to the internet or 
the router) [NAT12, ELE01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 10N, 13N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29L, 30L, 
34L} 
11. Configure router(s) and test as needed [SAN01, LEI02, COM02, 
CIS01, DEP01, DEF01, NAT06, NAT10, KEN01, LAR01, NAT17, 
MOC01, POS01, BER02, LON01, ROS01, NET01, CIS03] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 8-11N, 13-15N, 17N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29-
37L} 
12. Configure the switch as needed including VLANS [COM02, CIS01, 
DEF01, NAT04, NAT08, LAR01, NAT17, ROS01, CIS03] 
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{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 8-11N, 13-15N, 17N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29-
37L} 
13. Configure and test the workstations including security per the security 
plan [SAN01, COM02, DEP01, NAT16, NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, 
NAT09, LIT01, RUS01, FRA01, POS01, BER02, LON01, ROS01, 
DAY01, KEL01, GER01] 
{L.O.s: 1-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 13N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 20-24S, 25A, 
27A, 29-37L} 
14. Configure and test all data collection devices [NAT15, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 1-6G, 7-11N, 13-18N, 20S, 22S, 25A, 26A, 30-32L, 35L, 37L} 
15. Implement and test the remainder of the security plan including 
incident response and operational continuity [SAN01, NAT18, 
COM02, DEP02, DEP01, NAT15, NAT16, NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, 
NAT06, RUS01, NAT17, NET01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16-18N, 21-24S, 28A, 
32L, 34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
16. Configure the VPN according to the security plan and the requirements 
of the local network administrator [DEF01, NAT10, KEN01, NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 9N, 10N, 11N, 14-18N, 23S, 24S, 27A, 28A, 
29-34L} 
17. Test the VPN with the requesting organization without the RCEL 
router connected [KEN01] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L} 
18. Confirm the foreign network is isolated per the evaluation agreement 
(get a signature on this) 
{L.O.s: 35L, 36L} 
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19. Connect the RCEL router when the exercise is ready to begin 
{L.O.s: 2G, 6G, 9N, 10N, 13N, 15-18N, 23S, 24S, 29L, 31L, 32L, 36} 
20. Test the security of the VPN [NAT10, KEN01, NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L, 37L} 
21. Conduct the scheduled evaluation [DEP03, SAN01, COM01, MAR01, 
NAT18, COM02, DEP02, DEP01, NAT16, NAT14, NAT12, NAT03, 
NAT05, NAT08, NAT09, NAT10, LIT01, NAT17, DAY01, NET01, 
CIS03] 
{L.O.s: ALL} 
22. Collect data during the exercise [NAT15, MCC01, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 3G, 4G, 5G, 9-12N, 14N, 15-18N, 19-24S, 29L, 32L, 35L } 
23. Disconnect the router and VPN when the exercise is concluded 
{L.O.s: 8N, 12N, 13N, 17N, 18N, 19S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 33L, 34L, 36L} 
24. Document exercise activities and data collected 
{L.O.s: ALL} 
25. Analyze the success/failure of the security plan [NAT08, MAN01, 
DAY01] 
{L.O.s: 6G, 7-18N, 19-24S, 25-28A, 29-37L} 
26. Perform post-exercise forensics as needed [MCC01] 
{L.O.s: 8N, 9N, 12N, 14N, 19S, 20S, 23S, 24S, 34L, 36L, 37L} 
27. Debrief the exercise with both parties [SAN01, NAT16, NAT14, 
NAT12, NAT04, NAT05, NAT01] 
{L.O.s: 4G, 6G, 8N, 10N, 12-15N, 19S, 20S, 24S, 25-27A, 29-31L, 
33L, 36L, 37L} 
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28. Document as needed [DEP03, DEP02] 
{L.O.s: ALL} 
29. Prepare and send a professional report 
{L.O.s: 27A} 
30. Bill as indicated 
{L.O.s: 27A} 
F.  SCENARIO VI – AGRESSIVE CYBER EXERCISE 
1. The Design 
This scenario is intended to be a very aggressive cyber exercise.  Basically, the 
RCEL joins a VPN-based internet with other participating organizations and acts as both 
the aggressor and defender. 
This type of exercise is very realistic.  Any network deployed today with outside 
access will be attacked very quickly.  Col. Hunt(USA) from JTF-CNO (Joint Task Force-
Computer Network Operations) stated in an interview at NPS on March 9, 2004 that DoD 
networks are, on average,  attacked within 23 minutes of going live.  There are even cases 
of networks being compromised while being configured.  Again, refer to Figure 4 and 
Figure 5, to give the student a realistic experience managing complex networks the NPS 
RCEL uses subnets and makes extensive use of VLANs.  In Figure 16 [LAR01], we see a 
typical network configuration incorporating a perimeter router, a DMZ, a protected DMZ 
and a firewall. 
  
Figure 16. Typical Network Design with Perimeter Security[LAR01].  
 
The organizations involved in this scenario will need to agree on terms and 
conditions of the exercise and a mutually agreed upon start and stop time.  This scenario 
is very similar to the “capture the flag” type of exercise conducted annually at DEFCON 
(a hacker’s conference, http://www.defcon.org/). 
The network will likely need a full range of services: primary and backup domain 
controllers for windows-based authentication; DHCP server; mail server; syslog server; 
and DNS server.  Supportive applications such as FTP, MySQL(or other database 
application), Web Services,  and specific application servers may also be desired.  This 
exercise provides a good testing ground for recently developed applications.   
In the all out war exercise, the network can be configured with multiple 
redundancy/fail-over safeguards applied.  These may include multiple HSRP routers, 
load-balanced routers and switches and similar advanced techniques.  However, this 
redundancy adds a lot of complex network administration and few students will be up to 
the challenge without previous training.  The increased complexity adds little to the 
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educational process.  The only valid reason to add such extraordinary precautions would 
be if the students were experienced network administrators or if a particular network 
configuration was being tested or evaluated.  
2. RCEL Activities for Scenario VI 
1. Determine the purpose of the exercise [SAN01, IRV01, HIL01, HIG01, 
BIS01, BIS03, MAY01, PFL01, NAT16, NAT13, NAT01, BLO02, 
CHI01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
2. Jointly define the scope and restrictions of the exercise [DEP03, 
DEP02, NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
3. Generate MOU or MOA or other legal agreements as required 
{L.O.s: 34-37L} 
4. Define the scope of the network and identify data collection 
requirements [IRV03, HIL01, LAN01, BIS01, MAY01, NAT15, 42, 
MCC01, MAN01, HOF01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 21-24S, 28A, 32L, 
34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
5. Design the network configuration [SAN01, HIL01, BIS01, MAY01, 
NAT16, NAT12, NAT04, NAT05, NAT08, MCC01, NAT17, ELE01, 
MOC01, POS01, LON01, GER01, LEI01, NET01, HOF01] 
{L.O.s: ALL} 
6. Define network data vulnerability and risk [SAN01, NAT18, DEP02, 
NAT15, NAT12, NAT03, NAT05, NAT10, NAT17, HOF01] 
{L.O.s: } 
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7. Write a security plan for properly defending the host network 
emphasizing defense in depth [DEP03, SAN01, LEI02, NAT18, 
DEP01, NAT16, NAT12, NAT04, KEN01, NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16N, 21-24S, 28A, 
32L, 34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
8. Write attack plans as needed [MCC01, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 3G, 4G, 6G, 8N-11N, 14-18N, 21-24S, 21-28A, 32-37L} 
9. Get signed authorization to proceed from appropriate  
command/management levels [HOF01] 
{L.O.s: 35L, 37L} 
10. Connect the hardware (without connecting the VPN to the internet or 
the router) [NAT12, ELE01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 10N, 13N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29L, 30L, 
34L} 
11. Configure router(s) and test as needed [SAN01, LEI02, COM02, 
CIS01, DEP01, DEF01, NAT06, NAT10, KEN01, LAR01, NAT17, 
MOC01, POS01, BER02, LON01, ROS01, NET01, CIS03] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 8-11N, 13-15N, 17N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29-
37L} 
12. Configure the switch as needed including VLANS [COM02, CIS01, 
DEF01, NAT04, NAT08, LAR01, NAT17, ROS01, CIS03] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 8-11N, 13-15N, 17N, 18N, 23S, 27A, 29-
37L} 
13. Configure and test the workstations including security per the security 
plan [SAN01, COM02, DEP01, NAT16, NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, 
NAT09, LIT01, RUS01, FRA01, POS01, BER02, LON01, ROS01, 
DAY01, KEL01, GER01] 
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{L.O.s: 1-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 13N, 14N, 15N, 17N, 18N, 20-24S, 25A, 
27A, 29-37L} 
14. Configure and test all data collection systems [NAT15, MAN01]  
{L.O.s: 1-6G, 7-11N, 13-18N, 20S, 22S, 25A, 26A, 30-32L, 35L, 37L} 
15. Implement and test the remainder of the security plan including 
incident response and operational continuity [SAN01, NAT18, 
COM02, DEP02, DEP01, NAT15, NAT16, NAT14, NAT03, NAT05, 
NAT06, RUS01, NAT17, NET01] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 2G, 4-6G, 7N, 8N, 10N, 11N, 14N, 16-18N, 21-24S, 28A, 
32L, 34L, 35L, 36L, 37L} 
16. Configure the VPN according to the security plan and the requirements 
of the local network administrator [DEF01, NAT10, KEN01, NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 1G, 4G, 5G, 7N, 9N, 10N, 11N, 14-18N, 23S, 24S, 27A, 28A, 
29-34L} 
17. Test the VPN with the requesting organization without the RCEL 
router connected [KEN01, LAR01, NAT17] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L} 
18. Confirm the foreign network is isolated per the exercise agreement 
(important, get a signature on this!) [HOF01] 
{L.O.s: 35L, 37L} 
19. Connect the RCEL router when the exercise is ready to begin[] 
{L.O.s: 2G, 6G, 9N, 10N, 13N, 15-18N, 23S, 24S, 29L, 31L, 32L, 36} 
20. Test the security of the VPN[]  
{L.O.s: 2G, 4G, 6G,, 9N, 10N, 11N, 16N, 20S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 28A, 
29L, 30L, 32L, 34L, 35L, 37L} 
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21. Conduct the scheduled exercise[] 
{L.O.s: ALL} 
22. Collect data during the exercise[] 
{L.O.s: 3G, 4G, 5G, 9-12N, 14N, 15-18N, 19-24S, 29L, 32L, 35L} 
23. Disconnect the router and VPN when the exercise is concluded[] 
{L.O.s: 8N, 12N, 13N, 17N, 18N, 19S, 23S, 25A, 27A, 33L, 34L, 36L} 
24. Document exercise activities and data collected[] 
{L.O.s: ALL} 
25. Analyze the success/failure of the security plan [MCC01, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 34-37L} 
26. Perform post-exercise forensics as needed [MCC01, MAN01] 
{L.O.s: 8N, 9N, 12N, 14N, 19S, 20S, 23S, 24S, 34L, 36L, 37L} 
27. Debrief the exercise with both parties 
{L.O.s: 35L, 37L} 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis provides a useful laboratory support model for information assurance 
education programs.  The reader may adopt or adapt any of the learning objectives, 
exercise scenarios or network topologies for use elsewhere. 
Readers engaged in teaching information assurance may use the learning 
objectives, exercise scenarios and network topologies to reduce their developmental 
workload and enhance the teaching of information assurance.  
Chapter II opens by demonstrating the need for more IA education.  The 
connection between laboratory activities and learning theories is illustrated.  Building on 
the strength of both Dale’s and Bloom’s research in learning and retention, the RCEL 
provides a venue to support traditional IA courses or to conduct targeted training. 
 To provide a useful model for learning objectives, a survey of critical information 
assurance topic areas is presented and then correlated to the information assurance 
curriculum of the Naval Postgraduate School.  NPS provides a model from which to draw 
courses as the NPS information assurance curriculum is quite comprehensive.  Learning 
objectives that support the possible activities within the RCEL are developed next.  This 
model categorizes these learning objectives into five areas representing the type of 
learning processes and student activities taking place: computer laboratory skills, 
networks, security, analysis and leadership.  In the process of categorizing the learning 
objectives, the emergence of the leadership category was especially interesting.  When 
students work collectively or in groups in challenging, time sensitive settings, 
opportunities abound to strengthen their collective skill sets as officers and leaders.  
To demonstrate the utility and flexibility of the RCEL concept, the paper presents 
six cyber-exercise scenarios.  The premise of each scenario is that interaction with an 
external entity provides a high degree of reality and spontaneous experience during the 
exercise.  The second important concept discussed is that using VPN technology, the 
interaction between an RCEL and an external facility (hopefully another RCEL) can be 
safe even when very powerful hacking tools are used. 
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Scenario  I models a simple interaction between local users.  Scenario II 
established a network with a defensive perimeter and demonstrates defensive techniques.  
Scenario III reverses the roles and shows an attack posture.  Scenario IV allows two 
teaching organizations to define exercise activities that satisfy specific needs. Scenario V 
uses the RCEL to perform vulnerability testing.  Scenario VI allows each participating 
RCEL to attack and defend its network. 
To strengthen the RCEL model, each scenario’s potential learning objectives are 
shown and cross referenced to NPS information assurance classes.  This effort may prove 
useful to emerging information assurance education and training facilities.  
Exercise scenarios provide, in a compressed timeframe, an opportunity to 
participate in every lifecycle phase of network security: analysis, design, construction, 
and operation.  It is rare that an individual has the opportunity to see a network evolve 
from idea to operation.  This experience can be enlightening, and the RCEL facility 
provides a safe and controlled environment where success is immediately recognized and 
failure is not catastrophic.  
 While a standard computer lab provides some educational benefits, a RCEL has 
the potential to provide a great deal more experiential learning.  The main difference 
between a RCEL and a static computer lab is twofold: the RCEL is designed to be rapidly 
(even frequently) reconfigured and the opponent in any exercise is dynamic and real. 
This paper has demonstrated that an effective RCEL facility can be deployed with 
minimal equipment and expenditure.  Advanced RCEL configurations (Scenarios II – VI) 
are also demonstrated providing a range of possibilities to meet every information 
assurance laboratory need. 
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APPENDIX – ACRONYM DEFINITIONS 
AAA - authentication, authorization, and accounting 
ACM – Association for Computing Machines 
ASP –  Active Server Pages 
ASP - Application Service Provider 
BDC – Backup Domain Controller  
CS – Computer Science 
RCEL –Reconfigurable Cyber-Exercise Laboratory  
CISR – Center fro INFOSEC Studies and Research 
DITSCAP - DoD Information Technology Security Certification and 
Accreditation Process 
DNS – Domain Name Service 
DHCP – Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
FTP – File Transfer Protocol 
HSRP – Hot Standby Routing Protocol 
HIDS – Host-based Intrusion Detection System 
IA – Information Assurance 
IDS – Intrusion Detection System 
IKE – Internet Key Exchange 
IEEE – Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers 
IPSec – Internet Protocol Security, refer to RFC 2401 
IOS – Internetwork Operating System (®Cisco Systems) 
JTF-CNO – Joint Task Force – Computer Network Operations  
LAN – Local Area Network 
LO – Learning Objective 
MOA – Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU – Memorandum of Understanding 
MOVES – Modeling, Virtual Environments and Simulation 
NIDS – Network Intrusion Detection System 
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NIPRNet - Non-Secure Internet Protocol Router Network 
NIST – National Institute of Standards and Technology 
NSTISSI - National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems 
Security Instruction 
NPS – Naval Postgraduate School 
PDC – Primary Domain Controller  
PSTN - Public Switched Telephone Network 
RIPv2 – Routing Information Protocol Version II 
SIPRNet - Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
SSAA - System Security Authorization Agreement 
SSH – Secure Shell 
SSL – Secure Socket Layer 
TLD – Top level Domain 
VoIP - Voice over Internet Protocol 
VLAN – Virtual Local Area Network  
VPN - Virtual Private Network 
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